Munich 2025: Europe’s Wake-Up Call and the End of an Era

* Fair warning… this is a long read so have your drink of choice at hand before you start. You might need something stronger than coffee for this one.

In two days that felt like months, the Munich Security Conference laid bare the tensions that had been simmering across the Atlantic since Donald Trump’s election, campaigned on promises to end the war in Ukraine in short order through direct talks with Russia. The unease reared its head early in the wake of his victory in November, when Europe recalled the distaste he exhibited during his first term for multilateralism and the confines of the international order. They remembered his statements about NATO and the unprecedented conditionality he tied to the principle of collective defense that had remained, until that moment unquestioned.

Europe had breathed a sigh of relief when in 2020 Joe Biden was elected to office, and they could once again resume their previous patterns of behavior, whereupon the continent was coaxed into fully supporting the American position on Russia in late 2021 through an intense diplomatic campaign. By February 2022, as communications between Europe and Russia broke down and Russia’s war on Ukraine began, the course had been set for protracted conflict on the continent.

European capitals, failing to heed the age-old lesson of not putting all your eggs in one basket, proceeded to do exactly that. They leaned into their special partnership with the U.S., one that they described as being founded on collective principles and values, rather than a pragmatic alliance built on mutual defense and deterrence. In doing so, they tied European strategic outlooks to NATO and the U.S., which was strongly welcomed by an American government that sought to nurture this continental dependence. This strategy, it seems, was built on the premise that the election of Donald Trump in 2016 was a one off fluke that was unlikely to recur, and therefore there was no need to hedge against concerns of another shift in US policy.

Sensing that change was imminent, some European leaders began to take some measure of corrective action on their foreign policy, including the German Chancellors outreach to the Russian president for the first time in two years, after he had spent the last years refusing to engage with him in line with the American no contact policy with Russia. These shifts ran in parallel with the European charm approach to the new administration, that sought to highlight the joint interests and collective future they had an alliance, hoping that Trump 2.0 would change his approach to international affairs and place more value on existing alliances.

They were right in that President Trump would approach things differently this time around, but they were wrong in that the difference was that he would lean more deeply into bilateral transactional approaches, and more swiftly withdraw from multilateral frameworks. Immediately upon assuming office, he withdrew from the Paris Accords, the World Health Organization, withdrew funding from UN agencies, and began reviewing U.S. engagement with intergovernmental agencies even leveling criticism at NATO.

The illusion of things continuing as they had before was truly shattered when Trump began making outward threats to other countries’ territories, including, alarmingly for Europe, a fellow NATO member's territory when he claimed that he wanted to take over Greenland for national security purposes.

Even with that, and despite the unprecedented threat from one NATO member to another, Europe tried to contain the rift and manage the transatlantic relationship, despite the fact that the long-standing narrative of Western unity was unraveling before their eyes. And then came Munich.

From Ally to Afterthought: The U.S. Relegates Europe to the Sidelines

The new administration, under Trump’s leadership, was intent on making a bang. It landed on the scene, led by Vice President Vance, and immediately made it clear to Europe that it no longer had the strategic significance it once had. Through unmistakable messaging, by the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and the U.S. envoy for Russia and Ukraine, European leaders learned that Trump’s positions and statements were not about posturing, they were real policy that would be implemented on the ground.

The American Vice President led the charge. With his scathing speech that reverberated across the hallways of the continent, he leveled accusations of failure at European capitals, accusing them of not being able to identify their real challenges, of amplifying the Russian threats and underestimating the internal threats they faced (chiefly from immigration according to Vance). He downplayed European concerns about Russia, and called on them to support ‘free speech,’ directly referencing Elon Musk in his speech amid concerns of over regulation in Europe on American companies like X, Meta and Google.

Building on this narrative, Pete Hegseth, in his meeting with the Ukraine Contact Group made it abundantly clear that the American position had shifted dramatically. In the wake of President Trump’s phone call with President Putin , Hegseth stated that it was unlikely that Ukraine would join NATO, and it was unrealistic to expect that it would regain all of its territory, and that American troops would not be involved in any peacekeeping operations in Ukraine post war, resetting the status to what it was prior to the war. These preemptive concessions effectively address two of Russia's primary demands, indicating a U.S. desire to expedite the resolution of the conflict, even if at the expense of Ukrainian and European interests.

Adding insult to injury, as Europe reeled in the aftermath of the call and Hegseth’s statements, U.S. envoy for Ukraine and Russia, Keith Kellogg, stated unequivocally that European nations would not have a seat at the negotiating table. As American and Russian representatives gather in Riyadh to discuss terms and prepare for a possible summit between the U.S. and Russian presidents on Ukraine, Europe and Kyiv were left out of the discussions, and were not even invited to these meetings. Kellog stated that there would be a parallel American discussion with Ukraine on the issue, effectively positioning the U.S. (sans Europe) as the key interlocutor between Russia and Ukraine.

The message here was clear: there is no collective position, the U.S. has fully adopted Trump’s preferred approach of transactional bilateralism. Within the discussions on Ukraine’s future, and the conditionality of American support, the U.S. proposed an agreement wherein Ukraine would transfer half of its rare earth minerals to the U.S. in exchange for past military aid, an offer it that President Zelenskyy swiftly refused. In this proposal, we see the outlines of American immediate priorities, focused on securing critical minerals for its tech industry and neutralizing Russia, potentially even rallying to the American camp against China, which it has labeled its foremost challenger on the global stage.

Driving the point of diminished European relevance, Vice President Vance refused to meet with the outgoing German Chancellor, a diplomatic snub to the German government, while meeting with representatives of the far right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party that has a platform more closely aligned with Vance’s own anti-immigration and pro-Russia engagement policies.

Europe has long presumed itself a pivotal player in determining the outcome of the Ukraine conflict, having fully invested in the collective American-European position adopted since the outbreak of the war in 2022, but the presumption was based on a continuity of policy on the part of the Americans that faded with the new administration. With the new outlook, Europe found itself marginalized and without a readily available alternative to fall back on because of their uncompromising stance toward Russia over the past three years.

The message from Washington is unmistakable—Europe is no longer central to U.S. strategic considerations.

Europe’s Reaction: A Mix of Defiance and Disillusionment

The stark realization of the new American administration’s pivot away from its policies was followed by frustration among European leaders as they saw themselves being sidelined on issues crucial to the security of their own continent. Shifting into reaction mode, key speakers including the German and Swedish Ministers of Defense were quick to express their dissatisfaction with what they described as preemptive concessions to Russia before negotiations even begun. This was swiftly followed by rebuffs of Vance’s criticisms of European freedom of speech, and dissatisfaction at being left out of discussions on the future of Ukraine peace.

After the mandatory -yet unprecedented- refusals by European states of interference in their internal affairs by an external power (which must have been delightfully ironic for African and Middle Eastern governments to watch), they began to shape more pro active reactions, with France’s Macron calling for an emergency meeting today in Paris for the newly formed Weimar+ group to discuss how they would handle the developments involving Russia, Ukraine and the new American administration.

With their assumptions now completely shattered, European leaders are hard pressed to enact a more strategic vision of how they will engage the three main actors. Already the Ukrainian president, despite his calls for a European army, has stated outright that he does not believe that Europe alone is enough to provide a security guarantee for his country against Russia, effectively -albeit invertedly- undermining the European negotiating position. Already Lavrov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, has capitalized on the U.S. position and questioned the validity of even inviting the EU to the negotiating table. He went on to accuse Brussels of seeking to extend the conflict for its own purposes, framing them as a potential disruptor of any potential negotiations.

Expectedly, European leaders, made statements that seem to fit the Russian, and increasingly the American, rhetoric of Europe not being a constructive force on the table. German, British, French and EU officials emphatically stated that there could be no long term resolution to the Russo-Ukraine war without Europe at the table, accusing the U.S. of undermining the collective position on the necessity of securing a Ukrainian victory. These statements, without clear proposals (yet) for alternative paths, frame Europe as a disruptor while the U.S. and Russia work out the terms of peace.

As Europe argues about the process, and its leaders meet today in Paris to discuss their collective position, while describing the process currently under way by the U.S. and Russia as damaging the European collective security framework, the American and Russian delegations have landed in Riyadh and are engaging in discussions on next steps.

In addition to the immediate concerns of European lack of agency on issues critical to continental security, being sidelined also impacts the EU’s global standing. The American decision to leave Europe out of discussions on Ukraine has left European leaders deeply unsettled, not only because of the immediate implications for Ukraine but also because of what it signals about Europe’s diminishing role in shaping global security. If it does not have the geopolitical weight to influence decisions in its own strategic sphere of influence, what possible leverage can it have elsewhere?

It would be easy to lay the blame for this exclusively on the Trump administration’s pivot away from long held policy positions, but the reality is more complex than that. The Trump administration’s policy shift is a symptom rather than a cause. The growing divide in policy positions between the two reining parties in U.S. politics has trickled down into their respective foreign policies. Rather than being a one off, as Europe assumed during the first Trump presidency, the divide between the two administrations on foreign policy positions is now so pronounced that no single policy is guaranteed to last beyond the term of an administration. What this means for international actors is that planning for engagements with the U.S. needs to be framed within that time window; no planning can assume that what a particular administration agreed to will last beyond its mandate.

That is where Europe faces its current challenge. It has long assumed that its transatlantic partnership held a special status beyond the reach of policy shifts, that it would remain a constant in its global geopolitical strategy, and that it would last in perpetuity. More immediately, it assumed that this would translate into European involvement in determining the outcome of the Ukraine war, backed strongly by its American partner. Now, however, it faces an uncomfortable truth—that assumption no longer holds.

Europe’s Costly Illusion: Europe’s Gamble on U.S. Continuity Backfires

At the heart of Europe’s current predicament is a fundamental misalignment between its long-term interests and the short-term, transactional nature of U.S. foreign policy under Trump. While the Biden administration -and many of its predecessors- pursued a long-term vision of strategic Western unity, built on sustained financial and military commitments, Trump has abandoned this approach, favoring quick, transactional deals that prioritize immediate U.S. strategic and economic gains.

Biden approached his foreign policy from an assumption of abundance of resources and time, not fretting having multiple open fronts in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, and leveraging American partnerships in those regions to amplify U.S. power. Trump however has an entirely different launch point, operating from the assumption of scarcity of resources, and an already multipolar world with China posing an imminent threat to U.S. global interests and positioning. He also has little faith in his allies and partners and favors direct American control over alliances, an approach that manifested in his potions on Panama, Greenland, and Gaza where in each case his initial response to perceived security threat was to seize direct American control.

Europe’s mistake was in its deep commitment to its transatlantic alliance without hedging its bets to mitigate any changes in American policy. This mistake was years in the making, and a result of both organizational structures (NATO and the EU), and strategic misinterpretation. On the organizational side, Europe deferred its decision making on defense and strategy to NATO, an organization that evolved to a point where its main goal gradually becoming self-preservation, and secondarily to collective EU positions that were also influence by NATO due to significant membership overlap. This culminated in the ill advised decision in 2022 to pursue the uncompromising American position toward Russia without leaving itself a way out.

On the strategic level, European leaders came to mistake the nature of the alliance. Believing their own rhetoric, they viewed the alliance as rooted in shared values and principles, and that therefore so long as those values and principles endured, so too would the strength of the alliance. It is an understandable error, because when a statement is repeated often enough, it becomes taken as truth in our minds. However, had they had the luxury of observing the nature of the transatlantic alliance from the outside, they would have been able to see that it was first and foremost an alignment of interests not values. They would have paid heed to France’s own Charles de Gaulle’s famous idiom that nations do not have friends, only interests.

In the wake of WWII, it was a necessary force to counter the USSR’s western front, and deter any aspirations of expansion, and in the wake of the collapse of the USSR it became an important geopolitical tool through which both the U.S. and Europe could amplify their respective power and influence amid a burgeoning multipolar world. Had European leaders taken correctly assessed the nature of the alliance, as American leaders did, they would not find themselves in the predicament they are currently facing.

At this point, the American administration sees NATO as an encumbrance to its interests, and is acting accordingly. Exhibiting strategic flexibility, Trump’s administration moved toward a rapprochement policy with Russia, one that aligns with what it perceives as immediate U.S. concerns on the global arena, specifically containing China and reducing involvement -and therefore investment of resources- in conflicts it sees as bearing little return on the short term.

Europe, however, is not as flexible, and in failing to hedge its bets found itself at odds not only with Russia, with which they have had little diplomatic communication over the past few years, but also with their long time ally. When European leaders fully embraced Biden’s strategy, they did so without considering how vulnerable they would be if Washington shifted course. Their approach was based on the assumption that U.S. support for Ukraine would remain unwavering, irrespective of future administrations. Now, with Trump reversing course, Europe is left without alternatives, forced to confront a new geopolitical reality for which it was entirely unprepared.

At the core of it Europe has, misguidedly, raised the bar of expectations of what it constitutes as victory in the Ukraine Russia war, and has therefore cornered itself politically into a position that is difficult to backtrack. Tying this victory to preventing Russia’s territorial aspirations in Europe, even going so far as to describe any concessions to Russia as comparable to appeasing the Nazi regime in the 1930s is forcing Europe to retain its uncompromising position. This (ill advised?) approach fails to account for the lack of communication with Russia over the course of the war, a policy adopted in support of the U.S. position, a path that may have led to achieving some action plan toward peace before positions became so entrenched.

Europe also continues to overlook the necessity of engaging with Russia; the practical reality is that due to the geographic contiguity between Europe and Russia, they must find a way to engage beyond the conflict. Doing so from a position of strategic strength, rather than being forced to adapt to a new reality as is the case, would have served to account for its interests. Now, backed by the U.S., Russia has little interest in engaging with the EU until it sorts out its position with the U.S. and Ukraine.

Additionally, the American economy suffers no ill effects from war; as the world’s largest weapons manufacturer, continued military engagement is sustainable, and supports its strategy of global strategic reach and hegemony, what the Trump administration calls “peace through strength.” Russia, too, has adapted to a wartime economy, restructuring its defense sector, bypassing sanctions, and securing non-Western trade partnerships to ensure its ability to sustain conflict over the long term. What this means is that Europe’s posturing on defense, even if it were to ‘increase its defense spending’ would find itself running out of steam sooner than its continental rival, particularly now that it is not guaranteed to have the American security umbrella to back it up. War fatigue among European populations could eventually win out.

The continent’s security framework has long depended on NATO, a structure now dominated by a U.S. administration that no longer prioritizes European security. With these harsh realities in mind, European leaders are starting to take steps to decouple from the U.S. and strike out on a more independent course of continental collective security. As Lord Sumption, the former British Supreme Court Justice put it, the “U.S. is now, and likely to be in future, a very unreliable ally.”

Macron has convened an emergency meeting on the U.S.-Ukraine shift, and Germany’s defense minister has publicly rebuked JD Vance, but these are performative reactions, not strategic responses. The core issue remains unresolved: Europe has not yet formulated an independent plan to navigate this geopolitical shift and lacks the economic and military structure to sustain its current uncompromising position indefinitely. The transatlantic crisis has exposed a painful truth—Europe was not prepared for Washington to step back, and now, without U.S. backing, its leaders are scrambling for solutions they should have planned for long ago.

Old Habits Die Hard: Europe’s Failure to Adapt

Europe's greatest liability is not its military limitations but its inability to adapt to the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. For decades, European reliance on Washington to back their positions allowed them to maintain a posture of moral high ground without the necessity of direct action. This habit, nurtured by successive American administrations as it increased European dependence on the U.S. is the driving factor behind the current European position.

European leaders continue to rely on aggressive rhetoric, despite lacking the means—or the intention—to follow through. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer recently declared that he would be willing to send UK troops to Ukraine in order to deter Russian aggression, serving to exacerbate tensions, and feeding into the Russian position that Brussels is intent on prolonging the conflict. Russia has repeatedly stated that the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine is a red line —the very issue at the heart of the entire conflict. Starmer’s remarks, therefore, are not only detached from the reality of the war but also lack strategic vision: there appears to be no endgame in sight.

Meanwhile, there remains a deep reluctance among European leaders to acknowledge the unsustainability of their current trajectory. The economic and political strains of prolonged conflict, combined with their diminishing influence over peace negotiations, make it clear that Europe cannot maintain this position in the long term. Yet, instead of adapting to these challenges, European officials double down on their policies, rather than confronting the shifting geopolitical realities.

This crisis has laid bare the weaknesses of Europe’s long-standing strategy of deferring to U.S. leadership. As they dove into the Biden administration’s position without a contingency plan in place, and with Washington now pursuing its own path starkly at odds with its previous position, the continent is facing the consequences of its delayed diplomacy and its overreliance on transatlantic support. If Europe is to regain relevance in shaping global security, it must break free from old habits, reimagine its approach and carve out a role for itself instead of asking for a seat at the table.

A Belated step Toward Europe’s Strategic Autonomy

French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly underscored the need for Europe to take control of its own defense. For years, he has warned that European security cannot remain indefinitely dependent on Washington, but with Trump’s return to the White House and America’s growing disengagement from European affairs, his message has taken on new urgency. Last April, before Trump’s election, he stated that Europe’s relevance to the U.S. had waned, and described Trump’s re-election as an "electroshock" for Europe.

During the meeting of the European parliament last month, and the European leaders’ informal meeting on defense earlier this month, the issue of increased strategic autonomy took center stage, and with Macron’s invitation to the emergency summit today the issue has taken on increased urgency.

This sentiment was widely echoed at the Munich Security Conference, where European officials expressed growing frustration over their marginalization. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock emphasized that Europe must stand united and take responsibility for its own security, particularly in light of Washington’s unilateral diplomatic maneuvers that appear to favor Russia while sidelining European allies. European leaders made it clear that the current trajectory—one of dependence on U.S. military power—can no longer be sustained.

As the U.S. pivots away from Europe’s security concerns, Macron’s call for defense autonomy is no longer an isolated idea—it is quickly becoming a shared European imperative. The convergence of high-level meetings, frustrated rhetoric at Munich, and growing military discussions across the continent signals a shift in how Europe perceives its role in the world. For the first time in decades, the continent is seriously considering what it means to stand on its own.

To that end, in addition to the defense spending, we should expect to see European defense coordination that is parallel to but not connected with NATO, allowing the continent to set its own priorities and determine its own strategic outlooks moving forward.

The trouble with taking these steps in the current situation is that Europe is determining its long-term strategy based on the extenuating current circumstances and may therefore not see the forest for the trees. In trying to present a united stance of strength and deterrence, it may end up losing opportunities to forge a broader global strategic policy (not only toward Russia) that serves its long-term interests.

A Crossroads for Europe

The Munich Security Conference has laid bare Europe’s vulnerability, not just in terms of its military and economic limitations, but in its inability to adapt to geopolitical realities. With the newly minted Russo American dialogue, one to which Europe was not invited, the tables are turning on the continent. Its efforts to isolate Russia over the past three years have fallen largely flat, with Russian prominence in the Global South actually growing rather than receding as the Europeans had hoped, and now with renewed U.S. engagement, it is Europe that is at risk of isolation on the global stage.

To maintain political credibility, Europe cannot afford to fully abandon Ukraine. It also has to factor in its calculations how it will mange its relationship with Russia. To fully capitulate and simply accept the terms dictated by the Russian American agreements on Ukraine would be a significant strategic setback for the continent. It would lead to trepidation among its eastern most states that, observing reduced U.S. investment in NATO and Europe’s inability to provide deterrence, would find themselves in a precariously exposed position vis-à-vis an empowered Moscow on their borders.

That means that it has to juggle a position whereby it lends support to Ukraine and allow it to get some face saving outcomes that cannot be represented as a total acquiescence to Russian demands, a difficult feat given the American pre-concessions to Moscow. It must also reposition itself as a credible and equal partner to an American administration that demands that its partners show immediate value or face sidelining. It needs to present a credible position to Washington and Moscow, one that shows unity, cohesion, and strategic vision rather than one that is reactionary, rooted in rhetoric and simple refusal to engage.

If Moscow is invigorated by growing ties with Washington and bolstered by its prominence with the Global South, all while remaining disconnected from Europe, the continent will be left weaker and strategically adrift. A Russia that is engaged with Europe is preferable to a Russia that is aligned solely with the U.S., as the latter would leave the continent with even fewer avenues for influence in shaping security outcomes.

Beyond the immediate problem, Europe has to redesign and reimagine its structural mechanisms; thinking creatively is no longer an option—it is an imperative. Internally Europe has to reconsider the modalities of engagement, its decision-making processes, and the systemic challenges it faces. As it stands, the European model stands as a stark contrast to that of other global powers; compared to the U.S., Russia, and China, it is slower to adapt, constrained by its multiple frameworks. While these serve to ensure its democratic approach, with every member’s voice heard, it does not account for the need for rapid change in times of geopolitical shifts.

Europe must look beyond its transatlantic alliance if it is to position itself as a globally significant actor. Already, China, seeing the shift in the political paradigm, has made overtures to the EU, hinting at a global reshuffle that sees EU- China relations evolving as a balance to increasingly close U.S. -Russia engagements. If Europe is to navigate this crisis effectively, it must consider unconventional diplomatic approaches, including leveraging its economic and political influence to create alternative pathways to stability. It needs to forgo its bureaucratic and historical tethers and navigate the realities as they stand, develop more sustainable global diplomatic networks that build up its resilience and ability to assume the role of a global power.

The wake-up call has arrived. The question now is whether Europe will answer it.