Europe’s Awakening?

It seems that the election of Donald Trump as President of the U.S. has finally raised enough red flags in Europe to wake the continent up to the realities of the global order in the coming years.

Throughout Biden’s term, Europe’s foreign policy revolved to a large degree around its relations with the U.S.. While Europe and the U.S. forged a powerful alliance built on the foundations of post WWII victory, reflected in the Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO, they operate on different wavelengths.

The U.S. wields a pragmatic approach to the continent founded on realpolitik. It understood that while there were considerable shared cultural norms and values between European and American people, the alliance was primarily interest, not values, based. When confronted with the choice between pragmatic self-interest and mutual support for collective self-interest, the U.S. favors the former.

Europe on the other hand appears to have believed the rhetoric. Whether a result of indebtedness to the U.S. for its support during the war and reconstruction, and its defense and security umbrella during the cold war, or a result of bureaucratic or institutional inertia that had become accustomed to following American leadership, Europe gradually fell into U.S. orbit.

This served Europe well for the most part, but the omnipresence of U.S. support eroded European independence even when it came to its own continental security decisions. This became starkly apparent in late 2021 and early 2022 when the U.S. gradually but effectively goaded a hesitant Europe to adopt a more hardline position toward Russia than it might have otherwise taken.

So, the question remains: is Europe recognizing the new realities, or does it remain stuck in a cage of its own devising?

In the statement delivered by the new President of the Council of Europe, António Costa we can see the outlines of what may be coming for the continent in the near to medium terms, some of it promising a new outlook, and other aspects seemingly rooted in institutional inertia. When taken alongside the repeated calls by France’s Emanuel Macron to increase independent European defense capacities to reduce reliance on the U.S., the shift in Germany’s approach to Russia, we can see a trend emerge of a potentially more independent and effective Europe.

But First…

Before I get to exploring Europe’s coming direction, I will address a question posed to me about my focus on Europe’s global positioning, and the importance I place on its reduced reliance and dependence on the U.S..

Europe is a tempering presence in a global arena rife with increasingly sharp rivalries between ascending and descending great powers. Absent a strong Europe, the U.S. would be less restrained and more aggressive in its global outlook; a weak Europe that is overly acquiescent to U.S. policy goals can result in increased potential for conflict through an echo chamber effect. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. did not abandon its adversarial perspective toward global politics: the ‘you’re either with us or against us” approach translates into brewing enmity between different blocs.

With a more restrained outlook toward global geopolitics than the American approach, the presence of the EU offers a political buffer zone between the U.S. and its rivals. As the relationship balance, which already started in favor of the Americans- shifted progressively away from Europe, the U.S. used its standing in NATO to dictate (for all intents and purposes) a more adversarial strategy aligned with its foreign policy outlook.

The U.S., like Europe, wields principles, norms, and values in its external engagements, using them as a tool in its foreign policy repertoire. Unlike Europe however, it is more pragmatic, while it does have to maintain a semblance of adherence to these norms, usually for domestic political consumption, it discards them more readily than the Europeans in favor of its interests .

Europeans claim more rigid adherence, with varying degrees across member states of the EU, but for the most part collectively the EU is stricter in its adherence on the surface, claiming it to be an indivisible aspect of its values when facing the world. However, and this is an important interjection because in essence it weakens the entire foundation of the structure, when push comes to shove, EU member states will also prioritize their interests.

Nevertheless, because the EU is a collective of states while the U.S. is a single republic, EU members must align their approaches to reach their collective position, a process by which they attain a median approach that more closely approximates alignment with their stated values than the U.S., which can, through one executive decision prioritize or deprioritize adherence to norms, laws, or values.

This process tempers European approaches when compared to American ones. If Europe were to fully capitulate to U.S. policy objectives and allow itself to be led by American foreign policy directives, the collective West would be considerably more destructive to global peace and stability. U.S. adversarialism reinforced by Europe would be a formidably destabilizing force, and would inevitably lead to instability and conflict.

In fact, it is likely that if Europe were in a stronger position in 2021, it would have been able to prevent the Russia-Ukraine war. Its inability however to cohesively counter the U.S. diplomatic campaign that targeted individual European countries in parallel with the collective Europe, allowed the American position on Russia to reign supreme.

A weaker Europe is also more of a threat to Russia, which was not for its part playing a constructive role in post-Soviet republics and Eastern Europe (we will tackle the series of Russian miscalculations in a later piece). For Russia, a weaker Europe means a continent that is an extension of U.S. foreign policy, which makes it more of a risk. The fact that the U.S. is aware that it will not bear the brunt of any traditional form of engagement makes it less risk averse than continental Europe, and therefore more likely to escalate engagements.

Had Europe at that stage developed its collective continental strategy to a point that they could formulate their own priorities for the continent rather than rely on those of the U.S. led NATO, the outcome of negotiations with Russia may have been different.

A strong, united, and effective Europe would achieve multiple goals. Prime among them is tempering the growing rivalry by drawing power away from the two poles of global power around which other actors are gathering. With Europe standing separate, the choice would no longer be binary between one or the other, and the sharpness of the rivalry would be dulled by the presence of a median between the two opposing poles that offers alternatives to outright rivalry.

The threat of this third power veering to one side or the other would also serve as a deterrent to both adversaries against excessive escalation. For the deterrent to be credible however, the third party, the EU in this case, needs to be powerful enough to convey credible deterrence.

I already hear the objections that Europe would never be a neutral observer between great powers given its historical connection to the U.S., however consider that between the U.S., China, and Russia, the only one that made a threat on an EU territory was the U.S., a fact that Europe should have already taken on board by now in its considerations for future strategies of engagement.

For those reasons, Europe is an important balance on the global scales of power. Left to the burgeoning rivalry between the U.S. and China, and the increasingly emboldened Russia, the world could potentially head toward catastrophic consequences.

Europe’s Options

Antonio Costa, the new President of the European Council, laid out his perspective on where Europe is headed in his recent statement before the European Parliament.

He reemphasized that Europe remains steadfast in its support for Ukraine, pledging to stand firm for as long as is needed to achieve peace, and included Ukraine in Europe’s enlargement efforts that also include Western Balkan states and Moldova.

Costa then ventured into Europe’s global role. He spoke of the importance of renewing Euro-UK relations, and strengthening the transatlantic partnership with the U.S. and Canada. He added that the new multipolar world offers Europe new opportunities to explore renewed relations with other countries, dismissing the labels of Global North and South as inapplicable in the current context.

Venturing further into the topic of Europe’s role, he proclaimed Europe to be a pillar of the international rules-based order, supportive of an inclusive multilateral system guided by the Charter of the UN and international law. He reassured the world that Europe is committed to its international responsibilities on climate change and the reform of global financial institutions.

Turning his gaze inward, he elaborated on the need for developing greater autonomy in defense and sovereignty, citing the inciting incidents of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’s territory in 2014 and 2022 as the driver behind the renewed drive to increase defense budgets throughout the continent. Costa explained that these would include the implementation of the Strategic Compass and a Defense Industrial Program.

To drive home the urgency of continental defense, he stated that European leaders would meet on the third of February to discuss cooperation exclusively on this matter, with consultations with the Secretary General of NATO and the British Prime Minister expected on the sidelines.

His remarks are telling. They reflect a growing understanding of shifting global dynamics and the need to adapt to the new world where alliances are not taken for granted, nor built on effusive sets of values, but rooted in pragmatism.

His statement shows intent on the part of Europe to adapt its engagement to the realities on the ground, particularly with the U.S., implying an understanding that the decades long over reliance on the latter has led to a less autonomous, less sovereign Europe. He is correct in that assessment, Europe had relegated its decision making to the U.S. and NATO on matters that it never should have ceded leadership, particularly and especially in its dealings with Russia.

The format of the February 3^rd meetings on defense also hints at increased independence. European leaders engaging directly on defense, while deprioritizing NATO is an important development, signaling strength and cohesion in the continent. I expect that NATO an the UK Prime Minister will attempt to carve out greater roles and impact for their message during that meeting, despite not being at the center of it.

On the other hand, the format of the meeting is indicative that Europe may have developed tunnel vision with regards to the Russia-Ukraine war, and rather than broaden the scope of options for engagement, it may end up narrowing its horizons and options, and in so doing cause damage to its own interests in the long run.

When we take Costa’s remarks in conjunction with the evolving positions of European leaders, particularly regarding their relationship with the U.S. under Trump’s leadership, we see the seeds of change in Europe that may shift the paradigm, perspective and direction of the continent.

Possible Pitfalls

Continentally

Despite these changes and shifting directions, Europe is still chained to existing policy frameworks developed in the context of its transatlantic relationships. If Europe makes irreversible decisions before achieving full policy independence and sovereignty, it may end up with the worst of both worlds: a weaker transatlantic alliance, and elevated risks on the continent.

The markers of these problems lie in the deeply rooted concern about Russia’s increasingly aggressive posture, exacerbated by the ineffectuality of the economic and other sanctions imposed on it by the collective West. Europe and the U.S. failed to mobilize broad support for their position on Russia across the Global South, highlighting their waning influence compared to both China and Russia, a matter that indicates a measure of foreign policy failure.

For Europe Russia continues to pose the most immediate threat to its security. For this reason, Europe should broaden the scope of its options of engagement rather than narrow them in response to this evolving dynamic. If the leadership meeting scheduled in February crystallizes the concept that Russia can only be dealt with militarily in Ukraine, the opportunity cost for the continent would be considerable.

The risk Europe faces now when it comes to its continental strategy is that it could end up simply coopting the policies they formulated within the context of the transatlantic alliance. If they do so, they could end up with complex challenges that could otherwise have been averted.

The decisions made within the NATO framework since 2021 on Russia have developed considerable inertia, with both sides escalating and refusing to seek compromises, something that aligned perfectly with the U.S. European strategy under Biden’s administration.

The U.S. under Biden managed to entrench European over reliance on the U.S. for both security and energy. It severed the growing European-Russian energy connections and substituted it with its own liquified natural gas (LNG) and also -through escalating with Russia- ensured that the threat to the continent pushed it towards the U.S. more firmly than before.

Had Biden’s policies continued under Harris, Europe may have been stuck in the cycle, so the silver lining of Trump’s election is that it delivered a wakeup call to the continent on the necessity of ensuring its decision-making independence and prioritizing its own interests rather than those of a fragmented collective.

While there are glimmers of change in European policy, they may be outpaced by decisions made before those changes are internalized within policy making bodies. Despite the markers of change, these may not be enough to mitigate the deeply rooted policy decisions of the past four years.

On the continent, the prevailing discourse is that the positions of the U.S. and Europe were strongly aligned when it came to Russia in late 2021 and early 2022, but that was not necessarily the case. American interests lay in escalating with Russia and severing its ties to the continent and fostering an adversarial atmosphere that would tie Europe more closely to the U.S. and drain Russian resources at the same time. Europe on the other hand would have been better served by deescalating through parallel tracks of deterrence and engagement geared to discourage Russia’s incursion while providing hope for continued connection to the continent, and at the same time progressively increasing Russian economic reliance on Europe for greater negotiating leverage.

The hard line positions that the EU adopted instead forced Russia to seek alternatives to its engagement with the continent, which gives it more leverage in future negotiation due to reduced reliance and interconnectivity of interests, and drove it east into the waiting arms of China.

The Sino-Russian connection is now more cohesive and both countries have launched a campaign to disrupt Western hegemony over international systems, a strategy that has already begun to yield tangible results and will likely gain momentum given the foreign policy approach of the Trump administration.

Europe is strong economically and militarily, but having a perpetual enemy on its eastern front will drain its resources, shift its focus toward that threat rather than expanding its influence and developing a global power base. Many of its international ties will also remain impacted by a continued conflict. If Europe allows international lines to be redrawn without carving out its own independent position, the end result will be a global system detrimental to long term European interests.

Furthermore, taken to the extremes, both endgames are problematic for Europe. Full escalation with Russia could potentially lead to widespread destruction on the continent, while having a defeated economically exhausted neighbor on its borders that has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world is not an ideal outcome for Europe’s security either: desperation does not result in constructive decision-making environments.

The fantastical notion that Europe and the U.S. could somehow manufacture enough dissent against Putin with Russia to foster an environment of revolt against him may not be well placed; he has consolidated power, and while he remains at the center of it there is widespread support for his policy directions. If Putin left tomorrow, his replacement would likely continue along the same lines.

Globally

On the global level, Europe has also suffered setbacks, reflected in its inability to gather support for its position on Russia. That failure of foreign policy highlighted critical gaps in European -and Western- engagement with the Global South that rejected attempts to galvanize it against Russia based on ideological values and support for a purported international order. This was later exacerbated by Europe’s comparatively muted response to the Israeli onslaught on Gaza.

In his statement, Costa doubles down on this portrayal of Europe as a guardian of the international rules-based order rooted in international law, a perception that exists solely on the continent. Nowhere outside of the continent is Europe viewed in those terms. Unfortunately, it persists in engaging under this narrative. For it to have credibility it has one of two choices, either fully commit to the principles and values that it claims to uphold, even when they clash with its interests, or lean more toward the more interests-based engagement format. It cannot have it both ways because this policy -that it currently adopts- has labeled Europe as a bearer of double standards and weakened its standing as a credible actor on the international stage.

Further compounding the issue is that Europe’s self-perception as this standard bearer constrains its foreign policy choices and outlooks. It is a set of self-imposed artificial hurdles that complicate negotiations rather than add value to them. The U.S. pays lip service to the same principles and values, but with the important distinction of being able to swiftly and unwaveringly override them when it is in its interest to do so.

On a parallel track, European member states have also adopted foreign policy approaches that do not account for the changes in many of the countries in the Global South. Now several generations removed from their colonized past, leaders in the Global South hold vastly different self-perceptions from their predecessors and no longer accept the old format of engagement founded upon former colonial mindsets. This has reflected most visibly in the misadventures of France in West Africa, where resistance to French influence has manifested in no small way over the past few years.

In conjunction with increasing South-South cooperation, China and Russia present themselves as alternatives to Western powers on development cooperation, bilaterally and through emerging multilateral frameworks excluding Western presence, like BRICS. This translates to reduced reliance on Europe, and therefore less adherence to its policies.

Europe’s Options

Europe – collectively and individually- seems to have received the message: either it quickly and effectively restructures, focuses on developing its sovereign decision making, prioritizes its collective interests, or get overshadowed by global behemoths.

Before anything else, internal realignment is necessary. Disconnecting from long-held perspectives and policy outlooks and reorienting requires conscious effort. It necessitates due consideration of previous policy applicability and alignment with the new perspective and priorities.

Continentally focused priorities will not align perfectly with those of NATO, over which non-continental actors have considerable sway. If that realignment is not consciously undertaken, the remnants of old policies will color future outlooks, impacting the effectiveness and relevance of any decisions.

Acknowledging shortfalls is essential, and Costa’s statement shows that this is underway. Europe needs to develop its agility and adaptability, which is low compared to that of either the U.S. or China, in order to effectively engage at the global level.

It also needs to consider its role separate from that of its NATO commitments and its transatlantic ties; an independent Europe cannot afford to have its decisions swayed by NATO priorities or U.S. interests.

In that context, the European leaders’ meeting on defense may be premature. Absent an overarching guiding set of priorities and goals, focusing on defense will likely exacerbate tunnel vision, prioritizing the confrontational approach rather than exploring all options available to Europe.

Crucially, it also needs to reassess its engagement methodology with great power dynamics, and Russia. The first step is reviewing its global positioning, where it stands in comparison to those players, and the extent of influence and channels of influence and communication it has with them independent of the U.S. and NATO architectures. In formulating an assessment of its independent position, it can then assess the optimal way forward as Europe not as a part of a broader alliance.

It also should consider greater flexibility in its foreign policy outlooks, dealing with realities on the ground not as they were historically, or as it would ideally like them to be. Currently, Europe has, despite the compounding effect of wielding both the bilateral relations of its constituent member states and the bilateral relations of the EU a bloc, fallen short of its potential.

This is largely the effect of misguided foreign policy approaches, either rooted in historical bias, built on institutional inertia, or anachronistic in its approach. Despite these challenges, Europe has fostered powerful relations across the globe, which means that if these elements were addressed, it could considerably elevate its international position.

On the immediate threats on the continent, specifically the war in Ukraine and what it represents in terms of security risks and potentials for broader conflicts if Russia were to remain undeterred, Europe should determine through its renewed lens -founded on independent continental decision making- what its long-term goals are. It should also do so with an eye on how its decisions on the continent affects its engagements elsewhere, and assess the alignment of current policy directions with the new goals and priorities.

When factoring its approaches to foreign policy, decision makers should remain wary of the trap of the “sunk costs” logical fallacy, which would incentivize them to adhere to status quo policies not because they’ve proved effective, but because they’ve been in place for a long time.

When determining its position, Europe should be cognizant of the dramatic shifts in its perception in the Global South over the past period, and rather than fall into the temptation of dismissing them, would be better served by addressing them. In doing so, it has an opportunity to rebrand as an effective pragmatic global actor, adaptable and engaged, rather than rooted in abstract notions.

The current global order has largely rejected the premise that the West -including Europe- is the guardian of international law, collective values or other similar concepts, and attempting to retain that role will not add value to European foreign policy. There is a sense of collective ownership of those principles, and that every actor is as guilty as the others in violating them when interests dictate.

As for the transatlantic relationship, Europe would be well served to rapidly readjust its sights. With the incoming U.S. administration’s disruptive approach to foreign policy, and the threats leveled at Greenland, Europe has -or should have- recognized that the dynamics can shift at any moment, and that founding its global position on its alliance with the U.S. is untenable in the long run. Brushing off the warning signs and indicators in order to avoid making difficult decisions regarding policy reorientations will exacerbate challenges down the line and possibly lead to greater vulnerability.

Europe has an opportunity to undertake transformative action. It can leverage the evolving situation on the global arena to reposition and rebrand itself as an independent actor, balance great power dynamics and become a center of balance between emerging global rivalries, or it could find itself sidelined by those same powers and relegated to a less influential role.

How Europe will fare will hinge on the decisions its leaders make in the coming months.