Frozen Out: The U.S.-Russia Realignment That Left Europe in the Cold

President Trump’s ‘productive’ and ‘positive’ call with President Putin took Europe by storm. Leaning into his policy of ending the war through direct engagement with Russia, Trump took control of the narrative, engaging in a 90-minute call with the Russian president. This call followed the momentum of Marc Fogel’s release from a Russian prison, exchanged for a yet-unnamed Russian national imprisoned in the U.S., and was described as the starting point for negotiations on ending the war in Ukraine.

Sidelined entirely, European leaders found themselves excluded from discussions that will significantly impact their own continent’s security. Staying true to his campaign promises, Trump shifted heavily away from his predecessor’s approach to the war in Europe, leaving the EU out in the cold.

Far from a simple courtesy phone call between heads of state, the first talks between U.S. and Russian presidents since 2022 confirmed the promised monumental shift in American direction toward Europe, Russia, NATO and global geopolitics. With talks of a potential meeting between the heads of state, maybe in Saudi Arabia, events are accelerating with Europe playing catchup.

The call didn’t take place in a vacuum, far from it. At the same time that the Presidents engaged, the U.S. secretary of defense Pete Hegseth was making clear statements on the new American position regarding Ukraine, crystallizing the picture of a redesigned American policy.

But lets not get ahead of ourselves, join me as we break down everything that this engagement means for the U.S., Europe, Russia, Ukraine, and the world. As always, grab a coffee if you can.

The Art of the Deal: Trump’s Strategy for a U.S.-Russia Reset

During his campaign, Trump stated his intention to end the war in Ukraine through direct engagement with the leaders, and criticized the Biden administration’s unconditional support for Kyiv. This engagement, and the mutual gestures of goodwill -releasing the prisoners- preceding it were a fulfilment of this promise. Trump lauded the Russian leader’s choice of words during their call “common sense,” which Donald Trump himself used as a core principle of his promised policies, domestic and international, in the leadup to the U.S. presidential election.

President Trump’s approach to Russia is a core pillar of his broader foreign policy agenda. Viewing China as the primary rival, alienating Russia and driving it into the Chinese orbit simply empowers China to leverage its growing international influence in the Global South to further cement its international position. To this end, and recognizing Russia’s potential as a pragmatic partner, Trump may seek to align it with American interests, leveraging their combined power against China.

Trump rejects unconditional support based on ideology, a lens through which he viewed Biden’s approach to the conflict. He perceives the support and investment in the Ukraine war as a loss to be recuperated, including through the possible deal for its rich natural resources which the American treasury secretary is negotiating now, conditioning continued support on tangible returns for the U.S..

This direct engagement with Putin also conveys a very clear message to Europe, with which Trump did not coordinate prior to the call: negotiations, moving forward, will be driven by U.S. Russian engagement that had been stalled for years, reshaping the global order into one dictated by transactional interests rather than existing alliances or ideological affiliations.

The messaging has been unmistakable. In parallel to the presidential call, the American Secretary of defense stated during the meeting with the Ukraine contact group that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations were unrealistic, that the U.S. would not be any American troops on the ground for any negotiated settlement, and a return to pre 2014 borders may not materialize.

In essence, these would be a reset to the prewar situation in Europe, an outcome that Brussels would see as a total Russian victory, with the added consequence of having considerably soured relations with Moscow, and with its primary partner, the U.S. now more aligned with Russian interests globally and regionally. Europe’s investment in the U.S. position in 2022 , and their lack of hedging, leaves them in a precariously disadvantageous position towards Russia.

The fact that the presidents discussed a potential meeting, not in Europe, but possibly in Saudi Arabia, further drives home the point that Europe was not part of this discussion. The added element of U.S. direct negotiations with Ukraine for its minerals as a condition for support confirms that European concerns have all but been thrown out the window.

Taking the more direct route, Trump brought defrosted the American-Russian relationship and opened the door for an entirely reimagined global order with more cooperation between these two powers in the face of the rising giant to the east.

Europe’s Downgrade in Trump’s America

Since taking office, Trump has made it clear that Europe and the transatlantic alliance are no longer central to U.S. strategy. With his statements on Greenland, a direct threat to the territorial integrity of a NATO ally, and his tariff threats against Europe in place, his administration has reduced Europe to a mere partner, stripped of its former privileged status as far as the U.S. is concerned, as had been the case since the end of WWII.

Stemming from his disdain for the constraints imposed by multilateral frameworks, he afforded no special status for NATO or the EU, even questioning the validity of the collective defense clause enshrined as a core principle of the alliance. In addition to constraints, he projects his own mistrust of the institutions onto the expected behavior of others. Through his Greenland claims, Trump signals a fundamental distrust in NATO’s commitment to defending U.S. interests in the Arctic—a concern NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has tried to address through his engagements with American officials.

He has also apparently weighed the potential effectiveness of Europe and Russia to counter his main concern, namely the rise of China. Europe, as a bloc, is relatively lethargic and unagile in its movements and decisions, constrained by debates and self-proscribed principles that do not align with the rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape. Russia offers a pragmatic, relatively unrestrained partner than can adapt to shifting tides much faster, and could be enticed to shift its positions based on direct transactional interests. The fact that there is a singular point of contact, Putin, makes engagement much easier and faster than with Europe.

Sidelined but Not Out—Can Europe Stay Relevant?

The European reaction to Trumps call with Putin and Hegseth’s comments mark the growing rift in perspectives between the transatlantic allies. In anticipation of this shift, European leaders began cautiously hedging their positions soon after Trump’s election victory. In a remarkable shift, the German Chancellor made his first call to the Russian president soon after Trump’s win, and Europe collectively began reenvisioning their engagement with the U.S. since then.

Last month, in a European Parliament meeting, European Council President Antonio Costa acknowledged a shift in Europe’s approach to its alliance with the U.S., a point repeated during the February 3^rd leaders’ retreat on defense. In trying to untangle from their over reliance on the American security umbrella, Europe is discovering the price of dependency, and the extent of their exposure as a result.

As the U.S. shifts course, European leaders have voiced sharp dismay, unhappy with Washington’s unilateral approach to Russia, accusing the U.S. of going behind Europe’s back to make a deal with Russia, and making concessions before negotiations had even started in earnest. They disapprove of American attempts to sideline Ukraine and Europe, stating that a united European, American and Ukrainian position is necessary to successfully conduct negotiations.

The EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, even went so far as to draw parallels between the direct American Russian engagement on Ukraine and the 1938 Munich agreements with Nazi Germany where some European states allowed the Sudetenland to be annexed by Germany. She stated that appeasement didn’t work then and will not work now. Antonio Costa, the President of the European Council added that there would be no negotiation without Ukraine and the EU. The Swedish defense minister added that Ukraine’s NATO membership remained on the table despite the statements of the American secretary of defense, a matter of dispute because NATO is consensus based and if the U.S. does not approve it will not happen.

Meanwhile the German Chancellor called for a state of emergency on the issue of Ukraine, in order to allow for more defense spending and support for Ukraine, stating that Germany would not accept a solution that decouples European and American security nor one that does not include Ukrainian sovereignty. How he would achieve these goals remains unclear given the American position on the matter.

All of these positions point to one thing. Europe has been left in disarray. They made a mistake in their initial approach to Russia in 2022, leaning heavily into the Biden administration’s position, and now find themselves footing the bill. Trump and Putin have already effectively started the discussion without Europe, a realization that seems to be dawning on the continent, and Ukraine’s President Zelensky said that he does not consider Europe to be enough of a security guarantee for Ukraine effectively sweeping the rug from under European leaders even as they posture for leverage in upcoming negotiations.

Despite all these changes and shifting positions, Europe is still slow to adapt. Rather than reenvisioning their own way forward, they are now positioning themselves as potential obstacles to both American and Russian interests. Having adopted the heavily anti-Russian position since 2022, a strategic miscalculation as we can see materialize now, and ceded the initiative to the U.S. to forge a potential partnership with Russia, they are left squeezed between two great powers that are likely to reach agreements that sideline their considerations.

The U.S. and Russia have already jointly placed the blame for their former contentious relationship squarely on the shoulders of the Biden administration and moved on. Meanwhile Ukraine is seeking ways to entice the U.S. to be more deeply involved it its protection moving forward, while Europe appears entrenched in its former position.

To be fair, Europe is now in a difficult situation, partially of its own making. Decades of reliance on the American security umbrella and its manifestation in NATO embedded habits that are difficult to disengage from when it comes to foreign policy. Accustomed to American leadership, it was a relatively simple matter for the U.S. under Biden to coax Europe into a hardened position on Russia once the hurdle of Angela Merkel was gone, and once Europe adopted this position, its reliance on the U.S. skyrocketed as tensions soared with Russia. It became more reliant both for defense and energy (as U.S. liquefied natural gas replaced Russian gas in Europe), and therefore more amenable to American pressure to maintain its anti-Russia stance.

While the U.S. was easily able to discard its posture against Russia with the inauguration of its new president, Europe must navigate a series of bureaucratic hurdles to shift its stance. With various countries and collectives feeding input, and with a wide berth of stances among them, the process is significantly slower and has already resulted in a considerable sidelining of the continent as events progress.

With the new American administration’s and Russia’s readiness to engage, with Ukraine’s concerns about Europe’s ability to play a significant role without American backing, Europe needs to reconsider its approach to the matter in a way that reflects reality more so than it currently does, maybe even looking to out of the box approaches like closer engagement with China to balance the closer U.S. – Russia ties that seem to be shaping up.

Same Endgame, Different Playbook: Trump vs. Biden on Global Power

What, the question remains, is behind Trumps dramatic redesign of American foreign policy in Europe and beyond? Are there divergences of core goals, or is it the approach that is different?

When looking at it objectively, filtering through the immense noise of the news cycle and analyses, its clear that at the core of it both administrations have a similar goal to foreign policy, but have starkly different viewpoints. The goal, for both, is to secure American primacy and contain rising powers.

Biden’s administration operated from a perspective of being the most powerful nation in the history of the world, and thus able to maintain multiple open fronts and alliances without impacting its direct national security interests. It opted to use the international multilateral order that the U.S. helped establish and nurture since WWII to its advantage, shaping it to its needs and utilizing it to maximum effect against its rivals, leveraging its allies to achieve goals in around the world. It used Ukraine to weaken Russia in Europe and erode its growing influence there, and used Israel as a battering ram to weaken the chief U.S. rivals in the region and erode their power. It leveraged the ICC against Russia, while reprimanding it against Israel (without severing ties), it kept China occupied through calculated engagements with Taiwan and its east Asian allies, and kept Europe in check through fostering dependence on the U.S.. Biden’s administration played the long game, based on the premise of abundance of resources and time.

Trump, by contrast, is operating from the perspective of scarcity, through the lens of existing multipolarity, and that China is already a great power and is acting accordingly. As his Vice President Vance put it last year during his participation in the Munich Security conference as a U.S. senator, “in a world of scarcity,” the U.S. can’t support Ukraine and the Middle East and contingencies in East Asia, while keeping its domestic front secure. With that perspective in mind, securing the short term becomes a more pressing imperative, driving a sense of urgency to get ‘deals done’ quickly, and seize control of any variables to hedge against their risks.

Trump’s inherent mistrust of alliances stems from his transactional worldview—he sees them as unreliable commitments rather than strategic assets. If he can look at any possibility as a deal, why would others be any different? When looked at from this perspective, the logic flows consistently. Greenland has an outlook on the Arctic, therefore the U.S. needs direct control not just that provided by Denmark’s NATO membership, Panama controls the flow of shipping, the U.S. should seize it, Gaza presents a thorn in the side of American Middle East policy take over the territory. From that launch point, we then see why he also mistrusts multilateral frameworks; they impose constraints that do not allow for rapid adaptation to evolving circumstances and may lead to missing out on opportunities for direct deals. In the Russia situation for example, adherence to a NATO collective position, even one dictated by the previous American administration, would limit his ability to engage with Russia and achieve his goals.

The former administration looked at a broader more long-term perspective that may not yield immediate returns, but that ultimately served the goal of slowing down the rise of a multipolar world, even if that entailed some short-term setbacks. The current administration however already considers the world to be multipolar or at least bipolar and therefore has adapted its strategy accordingly, and therefore more selective and transactional in its approach to international affairs.

Whiplash Diplomacy: How Constant Shifts Undermine U.S. Power

Each of these approaches—Biden’s long-term alliance-driven strategy and Trump’s transactional, immediate-results-driven approach—has its own merits and drawbacks. Which will prove more beneficial to the U.S. over the long run remains to be seen. Biden’s model fostered dependency among allies, strengthening U.S. influence but at the cost of long-term sustainability. Trump’s model, on the other hand, prioritizes efficiency and short-term gains but risks alienating partners and creating a power vacuum where U.S. leadership once stood.

However, the real consequence of these abrupt shifts is not just the success or failure of any single approach—it is the erosion of global confidence in U.S. reliability. In the past, differences between administrations were largely variations in execution rather than fundamental shifts in grand strategy. Now, the wild swings in American foreign policy since 2016 have made it clear to both allies and adversaries that the U.S. is no longer a stable actor. Instead of building long-term strategies that rely on U.S. leadership, nations are increasingly hedging their bets, seeking alternative partnerships, and reducing their exposure to America’s unpredictability. If Washington continues on this path, it risks becoming a power that nations work around rather than align with.

The rapid oscillations in U.S. foreign policy have shattered any notion of long-term certainty, not just for its allies but for its rivals—and even for Washington itself. The constant reversals between administrations mean that no policy is truly set in stone, no alliance is unshakable, and no adversary is permanently hostile. Each new president has the power to undo years of commitments with the stroke of a pen, rendering diplomacy less about forging lasting agreements and more about managing its relations until the next election cycle.

Trump’s pivot toward Russia may be a pragmatic recalibration, but it also reinforces a dangerous precedent: that U.S. commitments are only as enduring as the administration that made them. While this may serve short-term strategic interests—forcing Europe to reassess its security model, shifting the balance against China, or extracting economic concessions—it also deeply undermines American credibility on the global stage.

Even Washington’s closest partners are being forced to reevaluate their reliance on U.S. security guarantees, economic partnerships, and diplomatic backing. Europe, now sidelined, is learning this the hard way—but it will not be the last. As alliances grow weaker and traditional security frameworks become obsolete, the world is being forced to adapt to a new reality—one where America is no longer an anchor of global stability but a fluctuating force that no nation can fully depend on. Ultimately, the greatest challenge to U.S. influence may not be the rise of a multipolar order, but the growing realization among nations that the U.S. itself can no longer be trusted to remain a constant in the global power equation.