Arab Diplomacy at Work: Presenting the Gaza Plan to the U.S.
Steve Witkoff, U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East, met with the foreign ministers of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Egypt, along with the Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to discuss the Arab plan for Gaza’s reconstruction. The meeting, held ten days after the Arab League Summit in Cairo, centered on Egypt’s $53 billion reconstruction plan, which received broad regional approval. The initiative aims to rebuild Gaza without displacing its Palestinian population, in contrast with President Trump’s plan to displace the Palestinian population from the territory, a plan that was met with resounding opposition by Arab states and the international community.
The Egyptian plan, backed by the European Union and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), has emerged as the most widely accepted framework for post-war recovery. Its legitimacy offers a foundation around which international efforts can coalesce, ensuring that reconstruction does not come at the expense of Palestinian sovereignty or further violations of their rights. Crucially, it also provides the Trump administration with a politically viable alternative to its earlier relocation proposal, allowing Washington to shift its stance without a direct policy reversal.
Following the meeting, the participating Arab foreign ministers issued a joint communiqué reaffirming their commitment to the Egyptian plan as the basis for Gaza’s reconstruction, and their commitment to continued engagement with the U.S. with this plan as a basis for the way forward. The statement also emphasized the need for a ceasefire and reiterated the broader goal of achieving lasting peace, security, and stability in the region.
But with Israel resisting aspects of the plan and regional dynamics shifting, can this emerging consensus hold long enough to turn diplomacy into action?
The Geopolitical Context
The meeting between Steve Witkoff and the Arab foreign ministers took place amid a flurry of diplomatic activity, with negotiations unfolding on multiple fronts. Witkoff, alongside Egyptian and Qatari mediators, has been engaged in ongoing discussions with both Israeli and Hamas representatives to extend the fragile ceasefire.
Meanwhile, the Netanyahu government is under increasing pressure from the Trump administration to engage in negotiations, though it remains wary of fully committing too soon, knowing that Washington’s diplomatic leverage could eventually become too strong to resist. To counterbalance this pressure, Netanyahu is actively working to keep other fronts -like Syria- open to secure the support of his political support base, which hinges on the prevalence of crisis and conflict, for the upcoming elections in 2026.
The Israeli government has escalated military activity in an apparent attempt to drag the new Syrian government into a confrontation. Israel’s Defense Minister recently declared that the IDF would maintain an indefinite presence in Syria, just as fresh Israeli airstrikes targeted multiple locations inside the country. These moves suggest an effort by Netanyahu’s government to shift attention and deflect from mounting international and domestic scrutiny.
At the same time, President Trump has recalibrated his stance on Palestinian displacement, effectively reversing his earlier position. During a meeting with Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Micheál Martin, Trump stated that no one would expel Palestinians from Gaza. This declaration effectively undercuts the Israeli far right, which had quickly pounced on Trump’s original idea for population expulsion as an opportunity to further their goals of annexing both Gaza and the West Bank. Now, with Trump pulling back, those efforts have lost their only international backer.
The broader U.S. realignment on Gaza reflects a growing convergence between Washington and its Arab allies. Over the past few weeks, U.S.-Arab relations have strengthened, partly due to Saudi Arabia’s increasing role in mediating discussions between the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine, as well as the potential trillion-dollar Saudi investment in the U.S. over the next four years. Trump’s first major international visit is also rumored to be to Saudi Arabia, signaling deeper cooperation with the Kingdom.
Amid these shifting dynamics, Israel has also found itself faced with the U.S. engagement in direct negotiations with Hamas through Adam Boehler, the U.S. special Envoy for Hostages, in an effort to secure the release of American hostages. This revelation caused a rift between Washington and the Netanyahu government, with Israel demanding that the U.S. refrain from negotiating through alternative channels. In the aftermath of this dispute, the Trump administration acquiesced to Israeli pressure, and Boehler was relegated to a supporting role, leaving Witkoff to take the lead on a broader mediation effort.
Beyond the ceasefire discussions, a major sticking point remains the future of Hamas in post-war Gaza. Witkoff has made it clear that Hamas must exit Gaza. However, the question of who will govern Gaza moving forward remains unresolved. Israel has doubled down on its claim that new realities on the ground must be recognized, dismissing the Egyptian-led Arab reconstruction plan as outdated and inconsistent with the situation.
As Netanyahu faces increasing pressure both domestically and internationally, his government appears determined to stall any constructive progress on the ceasefire while keeping multiple fronts active. The Israeli prime minister returned to court this week for his ongoing corruption trial, and his political future is becoming more precarious. Polls suggest that a majority of Israelis believe he should take responsibility for the security failures of October 7 and resign. With his legal and political troubles mounting, Netanyahu is more reliant than ever on prolonging conflict as a means of galvanizing domestic support. However, this approach is losing traction, as the war in Gaza drags on.
A potential pivot may emerge, in which Netanyahu reluctantly shifts focus away from Gaza to placate domestic demands for a hostage deal, while intensifying conflicts on other fronts, such as Syria or the West Bank. This strategy would allow him to claim he is maintaining a hardline approach without conceding on the broader Palestinian issue. Meanwhile, Israel and Lebanon are engaged in indirect talks over border demarcation, which Israel is presenting as a step toward normalization with Beirut, though it remains to be seen whether any meaningful agreement will materialize.
Adding further pressure on Netanyahu, the UN Human Rights Council released a damning report on Israel’s conduct during the war in Gaza. The report documents a systematic pattern of sexual, reproductive, and gender-based violence by Israeli forces, findings that have intensified international scrutiny. Israel has responded by dismissing the report, and accusing the UN of antisemitism, but the allegations will be difficult to ignore as ceasefire negotiations progress. Even as Israel refuses to engage with the findings, the report is likely to further isolate Netanyahu’s government internationally.
Against this backdrop, Witkoff’s meeting with Arab foreign ministers takes place in an evolving and highly dynamic landscape, where all actors are leveraging their influence to secure their interests. With the next phase of the ceasefire in question, Israel maneuvering to maintain multiple conflict fronts, and U.S.-Arab relations deepening, the coming weeks could prove decisive in determining the trajectory of diplomatic efforts in the region.
A Diplomatic Window
Beneath the surface, the alignment of interests between the United States and key Arab states is more coherent than it might initially appear. While their motivations differ, both sides share a common objective: the removal of Hamas from Gaza. For Egypt—followed closely by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan—Hamas represents a direct security threat due to its ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, a group these governments have long opposed. However, regional dynamics and political considerations have prevented these states from taking an overtly antagonistic stance against Hamas amid the ongoing war.
For the Trump administration, the current recalibration in U.S. policy is part of a broader effort to position itself as the key mediator in the Middle East, with Trump as the Middle East peacemaker. The American President wants to build on the legacy of the Abraham Accords while simultaneously working to bring the Gaza conflict to a close. His motivation stems from two key factors. First, he is looking to solidify his foreign policy legacy and fulfill campaign promises to reduce U.S. military entanglements in foreign conflicts. Second, he is responding to a growing sentiment within the right-wing policy circles in Washington, notably reflected in the Heritage Foundation report , which favors a reimagining of the U.S. Israel special relationship to become a strategic partnership, reducing aid and favoring trade and mutual interests instead.
Recognizing the strong and vocal opposition from Arab leaders to his initial displacement proposal, Trump has adapted his policy approach accordingly. In doing so, he has moved toward a more tenable position that seeks common ground between Arab states and Israel without alienating either side.
For the Arab states, this moment represents an opportunity to capitalize on the momentum from the Cairo Summit and leverage the broad international support their proposal has received. The Egyptian-led initiative provides a structured and widely accepted framework for Gaza’s reconstruction, offering a starting point for discussions that exclude any notion of Palestinian displacement. By rallying behind this plan, Arab governments are also working to drown out voices from the Israeli far-right, which continues to push for territorial annexation and displacement policies.
Engaging with the United States first reflects a strategic calculation by Arab leaders; by working to secure Washington’s backing for the Egyptian-led proposal first, Arab states increase the likelihood that the plan will gain traction and materialize, as the United States holds the leverage necessary to influence Israeli decision-making.
A Region on the Brink
The diplomatic efforts surrounding Gaza’s future are unfolding within a fragile and intricate web of competing interests. Every meeting, negotiation, and policy shift is precariously held together, as each stakeholder maneuvers to secure its position in a rapidly evolving landscape
One fundamental reality apparent to all regional and international actors is that the complete eradication of Hamas from Gaza is virtually impossible. The group’s structure is not confined to public-facing leadership but extends into second- and third-tier operatives, many of whom remain unidentified. Eliminating its top ranks does not dismantle the broader network, which operates in deeply embedded and decentralized ways. It is one of the reasons that Netanyahu has framed its total eradication as one of his war aims, because it allows him to extend the conflict for as long as he needs to secure political aims elsewhere.
Even if Hamas were somehow removed from Gaza, the latest war’s destruction has created an entire generation of potential recruits. Every teenager who has lived through bombings, displacement, and the deaths of family members is a potential adherent, whether to Hamas or to any successor organization that emerges in its place. The pace of recruitment is either matching or exceeding the number of fighters killed, as even Anthony Blinken admitted in his last interview as Secretary of State.
The far-right coalition within Israel, led by Netanyahu, is acutely aware of this reality, and counting on it. As long as there is a sustained security threat, Netanyahu can rally domestic support by presenting himself as the only leader capable of defending Israel. Conflict serves as his political shield, allowing him to maintain control within the context of mounting challenges. The threat of peace presents a situation where he would find himself forced to contend with the opposition, the court cases, and how he has single handedly positioned Israel in the most precarious international position it has been in since it was established in 1948.
With political pressure mounting, Netanyahu and his defense minister continue exploring ways to prolong instability in the region. If Gaza negotiations move toward a resolution, they may shift focus to Syria, Lebanon, or the West Bank, ensuring that conflict remains a central pillar of Israeli foreign policy. Netanyahu’s survival is tied to far-right figures like Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, whose political support he depends on to maintain his governing coalition. To satisfy them, he needs to derail negotiations, keep tensions high and the maintain the potential acquisition of further territory in sight.
Against this backdrop, Witkoff has continued pressing for a ceasefire extension, aiming to use the temporary pause in hostilities as a stepping stone toward a broader truce between Israel and Hamas. His proposal, presented to mediators shortly after meeting with the Arab foreign ministers in Doha, envisions a longer-term agreement that would facilitate the release of Israeli hostages and pave the way for Gaza’s reconstruction.
On the intra-Arab front, discussions continue on mobilizing financial support for the reconstruction plan. While Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations are expected to contribute significant funding, they are making clear that their investments will be contingent on international involvement. Past reconstruction efforts—in 2009 and 2014—saw billions funneled into Gaza, only for Israeli offensives to decimate the region once again. With this latest war having inflicted even greater devastation, the estimated $53 billion cost of reconstruction represents an unprecedented financial undertaking. This time, Gulf nations want guarantees that their investments will not be wiped out by another cycle of destruction.
As these negotiations unfold, the central question remains: can diplomacy outpace conflict? With Netanyahu’s government actively seeking to derail agreements, U.S. and Arab states attempting to impose a new framework, and regional players hedging their bets, the future of Gaza remains delicately balanced between progress and perpetual instability.
A Fragile Path Forward
The Doha meeting and the joint communiqué mark an important step in regional diplomacy, signaling a growing alignment between Arab states and the U.S. on Gaza’s reconstruction. With forced displacement no longer on the table, the conversation is shifting toward practical solutions for rebuilding Gaza under a regional framework. Egypt’s $53 billion reconstruction plan, now the dominant proposal, represents the most viable roadmap to stabilizing Gaza without compromising Palestinian sovereignty.
Trump’s public rejection of forced displacement has brought Washington’s position closer to that of Egypt, the Arab League, and the Gulf states. However, while the diplomatic groundwork has been laid, major obstacles remain. The most immediate challenge is securing sufficient financial commitments to turn the plan from a political framework into an actionable initiative. Stability will be a prerequisite for investment, meaning that a durable ceasefire and mechanisms to prevent future escalations must be established before reconstruction efforts can fully begin.
At the same time, Israel is unlikely to let this process proceed smoothly as long as Netanyahu remains in power. For him, allowing the Egyptian plan to move forward would mean conceding to both Arab and U.S. pressure, alienating his far-right coalition partners in the process. His government’s survival depends on maintaining the support of the far right that rejects any form of Palestinian self-governance, including the reconstruction framework proposed by Egypt. If Netanyahu were to endorse or even tacitly allow the plan’s implementation, he risks losing his coalition and, with it, the political shield protecting him from mounting legal and political challenges.
As a result, delays and obstruction are likely to define much of the year ahead. The upcoming reconstruction conference in Cairo in April will set the stage for international financial commitments, but it is expected that the actual process of rebuilding Gaza will remain stalled by Israeli resistance and protracted negotiations. Throughout 2025, the focus will likely be on diplomatic maneuvering rather than tangible progress on the ground.
Looking ahead to 2026, Israeli domestic politics could play a decisive role in determining whether Gaza’s reconstruction moves forward. Should the center-left opposition, led by Yair Lapid, gain power, a new Israeli government may be more willing to engage with regional proposals. Lapid has previously advocated for a Gaza plan that grants Egypt administrative control of the territory during its reconstruction, a position that, while different in scope, overlaps with aspects of the Arab reconstruction proposal.
Despite these uncertainties, the Doha meeting has laid the foundation for a more coordinated international approach to Gaza. While challenges remain, the gradual diplomatic alignment between Washington and Arab states marks a significant shift. As the reconstruction initiative gains international support, the coming months will determine whether financial commitments and political realities can align to transform the vision of post-war Gaza into a reality.