Shalom Hamas, Boehler’s Hello and Witkoff’s Goodbye
Adam Boehler, the U.S. special envoy for hostage affairs has taken center stage recently as it emerged that the U.S. has been engaged in direct negotiations with Hamas for several weeks marking a significant departure from past U.S. policy on direct engagement.
In an interesting twist, news of these negotiations surfaced shortly after President Trump’s “Shalom Hamas” post, where he told them it could mean hello and goodbye, and it was up to them to choose. The hot and cold approach caters to both the pro Palestine and pro-Israel camps, ensuring that his America First doctrine remains firmly at the forefront as Boehler engages directly for the American dual nationals held by Hamas.
Boehler’s role runs parallel to the efforts run by Steve Witkoff, the U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East. Witkoff was instrumental in securing the first stage of the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas and has been very effective in leveraging his direct mandate from President Trump in his negotiations with the actors in the region. His influence, combined with Boehler’s focus on hostage diplomacy, signals a dynamic shift in how Washington is approaching the crisis.
But beyond the immediate objectives of releasing the hostages and possibly securing a ceasefire, this sequence of events raises a deeper, more consequential question: Is this shift to direct engagement merely a tactical short term move, or does it mark the beginning of a realignment in U.S. strategy in the region, one that does not hinge as heavily on its special relationship with Israel?
The Necessity of Action: Why the U.S. Chose Direct Negotiations
Boehler said that the U.S. was not prepared to sit back for two weeks as others mediated negotiations between Israel and Hamas. His mandate, as the U.S. special envoy for hostages, is to secure the release of American hostages held by non-state actors. As such, and because there is at lease one dual national American hostage still in Hamas captivity, in addition to the bodies of four American Israeli hostages, it falls within his purview to engage to secure their release.
While Witkoff’s mandate is broader, and involves engagement with various actors to secure a ceasefire and lay the groundwork with regional allies, Boehler’s is narrower, more immediate and does not hinge on the broader political context; his job is to secure the release of American hostages through engagement with non-state actors. Witkoff’s position has remained that Hamas has to leave Gaza, and that there are no alternatives to this outcome.
Boehler’s work does not detract from Witkoff’s broader efforts, but it does signal increasing frustrations in Washington on how the talks are going. It indicates that the U.S. government does not trust in the indirect engagement with Hamas on hostages and has thus approved direct engagement with Hamas rather than rely on the other actors in the region. In an interesting materialization of Trump’s post, Shalom Hamas, Boehler is the ‘hello’ and Witkoff is the ‘goodbye.’
Meanwhile, Netanyahu has done everything he can to extend the fighting, opening new fronts, prioritizing his government coalition’s permanence over the release of the hostages; as Moshe Ya’alon, the former IDF chief of staff put it, Netanyahu is prepared to sacrifice the hostages to keep his government and coalition in place. This is unacceptable to Trump’s administration that campaigned on a platform of America first and therefore finds it unpalatable to leave the fate of the American hostages to Netanyahu’s negotiators.
The calculus in Washington would have been that their America first doctrine stands in contrast to Netanyahu’s political aspirations -winning the 2026 Israeli elections- which hinges on the continuation of conflict (in Gaza or elsewhere) and therefore American and Israeli interests in this instance were not aligned. American interests, under the America first doctrine, is the release of the American hostages, while Netanyahu’s interests lay in keeping the tensions high to maintain his domestic political support.
Adding further gravitas to the situation, President Trump’s threat to Hamas means that the U.S. would have to take action if hostage negotiations faltered, putting the American administration in a position where it had to deliver on its threats. Understanding that America’s further investment in the conflict would serve to bolster Netanyahu’s government and his hopes for reelection, strategists in Washington may have surmised that Netanyahu would therefore attempt to force Washington’s hand by stalling negotiations and forcing the U.S. to intervene against Hamas or further support his bellicose aims.
With all those variables in mind, Trump’s administration therefore may have determined that the best way forward was to seize the reins and engage directly in negotiations rather than rely on what has proven to be a partner with distinctly divergent aims.
Boehler’s Roadmap
Boehler has indicated that negotiations are making progress, citing a good “first offer” that includes provisions for Hamas’s disarmament and non-involvement in Gaza’s post-war political landscape and a five to ten year truce. When asked whether he believed Hamas would commit to that outcome, he said that he believed that they would abide by those terms, although that may be more of negotiating tactic to not alienate them prior to achieving his singular goal of securing the release of American hostages.
Beyond the immediate hostage releases, Boehler has also floated the possibility of a broader ceasefire agreement—a move that could shift the trajectory of the conflict if Hamas and Israel can reach terms, stating that a deal was possible within weeks. Additionally, discussions have included the potential release of all remaining hostages, suggesting that Washington is working toward a more comprehensive deal rather than a one-off exchange, which was a concern rise by Israeli pundits that the U.S. was going to work towards the release of its own hostages and not the Israeli ones.
In terms of achieving a broader ceasefire agreement and a longer term peace, particularly when it comes to disarming, Hamas would likely request assurances from the U.S. to guarantee the stability of any such framework, and protect Gaza against further encroachment, attacks, settler violence and other infringements. Getting this form of assurance from Washington would be a political victory for the group, which may claim non-involvement in the political ecosystem after the war, but will predictably leverage it for influence nevertheless in a different form.
Unlike Arab states that have no tools to enforce any agreement with Israel, the U.S. has considerable leverage and tools to pressure Netanyahu and his government. This makes Washington a far more credible guarantor in Hamas’s eyes, increasing the likelihood of meaningful commitments being upheld.
How likely Hamas is to both disarm and remain uninvolved in the politics of Gaza post conflict is questionable; being sidelined as a political entity would be contrary to their goals as an organization, and therefore would require a balancing act and careful and consistent involvement by regional actors and the U.S., in addition to removing the justifications for Hamas’s existence as an armed entity.
Discussions about Hamas disarming however seem inconsistent with Witkoff’s statement that Hamas needs to depart Gaza entirely, so there are parallel and unaligned paths being explored by American negotiators, which one ultimately pans out will remain to be seen.
Netanyahu’s Problem with Direct Talks
The Israeli government is concerned about Washington’s decision to engage directly with Hamas—both for immediate tactical reasons and the long-term strategic ramifications it could have.
For Israel, any public divergence in position between Washington and Tel Aviv is a liability. As Israel’s primary political and military backer, the U.S. wielding its own negotiating power immediately weakens Israel’s leverage with Washington. Boehler’s direct talks with Hamas signal a shift in priorities between the two allies, a reality he underscored by openly stating that his mandate is to secure American interests—not to act as Israel’s agent.
For Netanyahu, there are further calculations that make this American decision problematic. If the U.S. negotiator manages to secure a hostage deal in a matter of weeks through direct engagement with Hamas, while achieving the core aims for security and releasing the hostages, then the question that will resound within Israel will be why did Netanyahu fail to do the same in 18 months, and after a protracted war and conflict? The pressure on his government, if the American negotiator succeeds, will multiply even as it already gains momentum within Israel with continued demonstrations demanding hostage releases.
The implications extend beyond Netanyahu himself. His far-right coalition has worked hard to present itself as the only legitimate force capable of securing hostages and ensuring Israel’s security. It has leveraged the conflict to galvanize support for its expansionist goals including the annexation of both Gaza and the West Bank, citing the impossibility of achieving security without those goals. If Washington succeeds where they have failed, or if their failure is exposed as deliberate political maneuvering, it could further destabilize Netanyahu’s already fragile government and ultimately result in their loss come election time.
Another issue for the Israeli government is that direct contact between Hamas and the U.S. reduces Israel’s control over the narrative, which means that a possible shift in position in Washington could occur as a result of these direct engagements. This narrative framing reduction would reduce Netanyahu’s ability to justify actions that extend the conflict (in service of his political career) and could result in resistance from Washington moving forward.
If a deal were to materialize, resulting in the release of hostages, and other guarantees of disarmament by Hamas, brokered by the U.S., Israel’s free hand in violating its terms would be limited. Violations by Israel of a deal brokered by Trump could now directly strain relations with Washington, and with a president that puts a lot of weight on achieving a stable Middle East through the framework of the Abraham accords, and that seeks to nurture long term ties with the gulf rich nations and attract their investments in the American economy.
Looking at the shift in tide for Zelensky amid the shift in the American position on the Russia Ukraine war, Netanyahu would want to nip any direct contact that reduces his control over the narrative. More direct involvement with the actors on the ground may see a gradual sidelining of Israel and the reassessment of American interests in the region as a result.
Given these stakes, it is highly likely that Israel will continue to undermine Boehler’s efforts, and ramp up pressure on the Trump administration to cease direct negotiations. If Boehler succeeds, it would place an undeniable spotlight on the failures of Netanyahu’s government, reinforcing the growing perception that his government’s prolonged war efforts have been more about political survival than genuine security concerns and the return of the hostages.
A Changing Tide?
This shift in perspective, the direct engagement approach, presents an important opportunity to Palestine, Hamas, and the Arab states. Several Arab countries, among them Egypt and Qatar, have been balancing key roles as mediators, attempting to navigate the diametrically opposing positions to achieve a measure of stability in the region and prevent the situation from spiraling even further and spilling out into a regional conflict.
The Trump administration’s decision to publicly acknowledge direct engagement with Hamas, rather than relying solely on intermediaries, signals that Washington is listening to different voices. While backchannel communication has always existed, this public shift presents a challenge to the Israeli position on negotiations.
With Boehler’s direct engagement with Hamas over the past weeks working in parallel with Witkoff’s broader strategic engagement, the picture being presented to Trump back in Washington is taking on a different shape. On the near term, Boehler’s moves, coupled with Trump not mentioning his Gaza displacement idea during his speech to congress, and the proposal by Arab states for the post conflict management and reconstruction of Gaza, indicate that the notion of removal of Palestinians from Gaza has receded -at least temporarily- from the forefront of Trump’s approach.
This, in turn, isolates the ultranationalist wing of Israel’s government and empowers the center left in Israel to levy accusation of ineffectiveness and bad faith negotiations at the governing Likud coalition led by Netanyahu.
Regional players that were concerned about having to bear the brunt of any displacement of Palestinians, specifically Egypt and Jordan, would welcome a shift in perspective on the issue in Washington. The Arab plan for the reconstruction of Gaza, adopted by the Arab League and endorsed by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, was also welcomed by the EU and with the shifting momentum in Washington may eventually find traction with the Trump administration in an amended form.
The shifting American perspective also strengthens the position of Saudi Arabia, which has become an increasingly important regional partner for the Trump administration since the inauguration in January, with President Trump stating that he may visit Saudi Arabia for his first foreign trip even as the Saudi government pledges a trillion dollar investment into the U.S. economy over the next four years. As the U.S. position on Gaza distances from the displacement option, the opportunity for Riyadh to strongly engage rises.
Using Boehler for the immediate outcome, the release of the dual citizen American hostages, while leaning on Witkoff for the broader ceasefire and engagement mediation with regional actors is a maneuver of direct and indirect engagement that places the U.S. at the center of events in the region.
Washington’s New Play
Boehler’s statement that the U.S. is not an agent of Israel is an important shifting point, not because the U.S. was ever Israel’s agent (a frequent misunderstanding of the dynamic between the countries), but because the public acknowledgement of having specific and distinct interests separate from Israel’s signals that the America First doctrine applies across the globe, and Israel may find that it is not an exception to this rule.
By stepping in and taking direct control of the hostage negotiations despite Israel’s objections, Washington may have deliberately or inadvertently signaled that its trust in the Netanyahu government to achieve this goal has declined. Netanyahu is not well regarded at the elite levels of political decision making in Washington, with several American presidents expressing exasperation with his political antics over the years, and Trump does not, despite the amicable and friendly meeting in Washington, trust him.
This approach is reflective of the broader pattern of engagement adopted by the Trump administration on international affairs, that of direct involvement and seizing control where possible. It was evident on Ukraine and Russia, where it engaged directly with Moscow and is currently at the forefront of seeking a ceasefire in the war in Europe despite Europe’s objections, and may now be taking form in the Middle East with Boehler’s effort an Trump’s direct outreach to Iran for nuclear negotiations- if it does not give in to Israeli pressure to shift course.
The U.S. has leveraged Israel as a regional enforcer, tilting the balance in Israel’s favor in a way that served American geopolitical interests. Trump's direct diplomatic outreach -if it persists- could challenge this dynamic and diminish Israel’s strategic value, something that would raise alarm bells not only for Netanyahu but for the broader political establishment within Israel. Reduced strategic value translates to reduced influence in Washington, which would be disastrous for Tel Aviv and therefore is expected to meet very strong resistance.