Cairo’s Countermove: The Arab Plan for Gaza
The Emergency Summit for Palestine, held in Cairo yesterday, marked a decisive moment in Arab diplomacy, bringing together world leaders in a show of solidarity with Gaza. The summit was a response to the displacement proposal floated by President Trump last month to displace Palestinians from Gaza and transform the strip into a “Middle Eastern Riviera”. During the Summit, Arab leaders adopted Egypt’s plan: a comprehensive blueprint for Gaza’s early recovery, reconstruction, and long-term governance, with security guarantees for both Palestinians and Israel.
The summit was the culmination of intense intra-Arab negotiations, aimed at forging a unified stance on Gaza’s future. It followed a smaller, high-level informal meeting in Riyadh, where key regional players laid the groundwork for broader Arab consensus, which was preceded by intense coordination between key Arab states at the ministerial level.
With the summit now concluded, the critical questions remain: What did this meeting achieve? What were the key outcomes? And how will they shape the situation on the ground?
Strategic Absences and Diplomatic Nuances: Who Attended and What It Signaled
Even before discussions began, the guest list itself revealed key diplomatic nuances. Notably absent were Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, both central figures in regional diplomacy. Their decision to send foreign ministers instead of attending personally suggested a degree of strategic caution rather than outright disengagement. Combined with the absence of Oman’s Sultan, we have half of the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council absent from the summit, a matter of note given that they are expected to take on a significant role during the subsequent steps of the plan, crucially the financing aspects of it. Taken together, these subtle signals suggest that while they have accepted the Egyptian plan in general terms, there are nuanced differences in their approach that will need to be addressed ahead of April’s Gaza Reconstruction Conference in Egypt.
Similarly, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia’s leaders did not attend, citing concerns over the level of consultation in drafting the final communique. Officials from these North African states indicated that Egypt’s leadership of the process prioritized certain regional perspectives over others, creating some dissatisfaction. However, their absence was not a rejection of the summit’s objectives, as they ultimately endorsed the final communique.
While these diplomatic nuances were evident, the wider Arab League consensus remained intact, despite the optics signaling some level of disagreement. North African states, though geographically further from the immediate crisis, have their own geopolitical considerations—for example, Morocco’s recent agreement with Israel’s Elbit Systems underscores its careful balancing act between its interests with Israel and its adherence to a common Arab position. Despite differences in approach, the final communique’s unanimous adoption reinforced the Arab League’s collective commitment to Gaza’s reconstruction.
The attendance of Syria’s new president marks his first participation in an Arab League summit. His visit to Cairo solidified his reentry into the Arab diplomatic fold, following earlier visits to Riyadh and Amman, as well as his recent meeting with Qatar’s Emir. While not central to the Gaza discussions, his presence underscored Syria’s growing normalization within the region.
Despite these regional differences, the summit secured strong international representation. Attendees included the UN Secretary-General, the European Council President, the Angolan President (representing the African Union), and the Secretary-General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Their participation reinforced the international legitimacy of the summit’s outcomes, framing Gaza’s reconstruction as an international rather than an exclusively Arab initiative.
These international figures, collectively representing a significant chunk of the international community, expressed clear support for the summit’s goals, endorsing the reconstruction plan, ceasefire implementation, and renewed peace talks and the two state solution. Their statements highlighted broad diplomatic backing, adding weight to calls for humanitarian access and long-term stability.
The European position stood out; as the EU grows distant from the U.S. owing to the Trump administration’s handling of the Russia-Ukraine portfolio, it is increasingly seeking to carve out its new international role. Toward that goal, we see a more proactively engaged EU in the Middle East, and the statement by the President of the European Council positioned it at a clear distance from the American position proposed by Trump, and the Israeli position under Netanyahu’s government.
Despite some leaders opting out, every Arab country was officially represented, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE sending their foreign ministers. While their level of participation suggests that discussions on Gaza’s future are ongoing, their attendance and endorsement of the final communique confirm a broad, collective commitment to the summit’s objectives.
The Summit’s Key Outcomes: A United Front on Gaza’s Reconstruction
The Summit resulted in a unified Arab League stance on Gaza, with all 22 member states and international representatives rejecting the forced displacement of Palestinians and reaffirming commitment to a two-state solution. The summit called for immediate humanitarian relief and long-term reconstruction, while also voicing full support for UNRWA, and ultimately, the final communique was adopted unanimously, reinforcing a cohesive Arab position backed by broader international partners.
The summit also endorsed Egypt’s proposed roadmap for Gaza’s post-war and reconstruction and governance. The plan outlines a temporary independent technocratic administration tasked with stabilizing Gaza and overseeing large-scale reconstruction. An Arab trained security force would support this process, contingent on armed factions stepping aside. The initiative calls for reconstruction efforts, including housing, infrastructure, and the development of a new port—with an explicit rejection of any forced population displacement (more details about the plan in the next section).
The rejection of displacement is particularly significant for Egypt and Jordan, both of which see any forced Palestinian exodus as an existential threat. Allowing such a precedent could set the stage for future pressures on their own borders, in addition to fomenting internal instability and increase their exposure to external attacks from Israel under the pretext of security. Their firm opposition, shared by other Arab governments wary of domestic backlash, made the Egyptian proposal the most viable alternative to avoid an escalating regional crisis.
The communiqué unequivocally rejects the forced expulsion of Palestinians, describing such actions as ethnic cleansing. It calls for full adherence to the ceasefire, unrestricted humanitarian aid access, and renewed diplomatic efforts to establish a sovereign Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. The document also emphasizes the need for the Palestinian Authority’s return to Gaza, positioning it as part of the reconstruction and governance process.
The communique also stressed the urgency of implementing the ceasefire agreement, while also acknowledging the Trump administration’s role in facilitating negotiations. It welcomes internal reforms within the Palestinian Authority, highlighting the need to unify Palestinian governance under a single entity—a move implicitly aimed at sidelining Hamas without explicitly stating so. Additionally, Egypt and Jordan will take the lead in training Palestinian security forces, while the summit formally requests the UN Security Council to consider deploying an international peacekeeping force to stabilize both Gaza and the West Bank. In an effort to broaden international commitment to a two-state solution, the summit welcomed the work of the Global Alliance to Implement the Two State Solution led by Saudi Arabia, the EU, and Norway.
As part of a measured diplomatic pressure strategy, the summit’s communique tasked a legal committee to assess whether Israel’s actions in Palestine meet the criteria for genocide under international law. This move signals a potential escalation of legal action should Israel refuse to engage in negotiations—a strategic application of international law as leverage.
On behalf of the Palestinian Authority, President Mahmoud Abbas proposed holding legislative and presidential elections in Palestine, aiming to restore legitimacy to Palestinian governance in the eyes of the international community. The move is also designed to undermine Hamas’ influence in Gaza through political means, rather than military confrontation—offering a path toward Palestinian political consolidation.
To turn commitments into tangible action, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi announced that Egypt will host the Gaza Reconstruction Conference in April, which will serve as a fundraising platform. This plan is based on the condition that Palestinians remain in Gaza, ensuring that reconstruction efforts do not facilitate displacement but rather restore stability and normal life.
Egypt’s Plan
The summit’s cornerstone achievement was the adoption of Egypt’s ambitious plan for Gaza’s reconstruction and governance. This proposal envisions a multilateral effort requiring extensive international cooperation, diplomatic coordination, and a staggering $53 billion in funding. In presenting the plan, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi drew parallels to the historic 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, emphasizing how diplomatic engagement—however difficult—had previously paved the way for lasting stability.
Egypt’s comprehensive roadmap spans governance, security, reconstruction, economic recovery, humanitarian aid, and financing. The plan is built on three core principles, including no forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, full implementation of the ceasefire agreement, and securing the release of hostages as part of a broader political resolution. These pillars frame the initiative not merely as a reconstruction effort but as a long-term strategy to stabilize Gaza and set a path toward broader peace.
The initial phase of the plan envisions an interim, politically unaffiliated technocratic administration overseeing Gaza’s governance. This temporary governing body would lay the groundwork for an eventual return of Palestinian Authority control. In parallel, Egypt and Jordan will train Palestinian security forces, ensuring that local law enforcement is prepared to operate independently of armed factions.
The plan is structured into three sequential phases, the early recovery, which focuses on clearing debris, restoring basic services, and providing immediate humanitarian relief, followed by reconstruction that centers on housing, infrastructure, and rebuilding essential facilities like hospitals, schools, and transport links, and finally development, which aims for long-term economic revitalization through industrial investment, energy projects, and trade integration. All three phases are explicitly designed to be implemented without displacing Palestinians. The funding mechanism for these efforts will be launched at the Gaza Reconstruction Conference in April, where Egypt will rally international donors to commit to long-term financing.
Beyond rebuilding Gaza, the plan positions itself as a security framework that benefits both Palestinians and Israelis. By stabilizing Gaza under a structured, internationally supported administration, the initiative seeks to reduce the conditions fueling cycles of violence, that, If implemented successfully, could serve as a stepping stone toward a broader, sustainable peace framework.
Can It Work? The Challenges and Strategic Implications
The plan draws comparisons to past reconstruction efforts, citing examples such as post-war Japan and Germany as models for rebuilding war-torn regions. However, a critical distinction sets Gaza apart: in this case, there is an active actor seeking to prevent reconstruction. Egypt is well aware that Netanyahu has no intention of allowing a stabilized and prosperous Gaza to emerge. Such an outcome would undermine both his political survival and the long-term ambitions of Israel’s far-right leaders, including Itamar Ben Gvir, Bezalel Smotrich, and other hardliners who have openly expressed aspirations to reshape Gaza’s future on Israeli terms, and seize as much of its territory as they can.
Compounding this challenge, the plan directly contradicts the Trump administration’s proposed displacement strategy, which envisions relocating Gaza’s population rather than rebuilding it. While Washington may not explicitly oppose the Egyptian plan, its lukewarm reception could give Israel tacit approval to derail the initiative—a move that would allow it to later claim that Gaza’s reconstruction was never viable to begin with.
However, immediate implementation is not necessarily the key objective at this stage. More important is the fact that there is now a concrete, internationally backed alternative to displacement on the table. When Trump’s administration first floated the idea of resettling Gaza’s population elsewhere, one of its primary arguments was that no alternative proposals existed. The adoption of the Egyptian plan not only by Arab states, but with the support of international partners, eliminates that argument entirely, placing the burden of rejection on those who oppose it.
This plan achieves several strategic objectives at once. First, it establishes a viable roadmap for Gaza’s recovery—one that enjoys not just Arab, but broad international support. More significantly, it shifts the burden of opposition onto the U.S. and Israel, forcing them to either engage with the proposal or actively work to block it. If Washington and Tel Aviv choose to derail the initiative, they will now have to justify why they are opposing a widely supported, diplomatic path forward.
The comprehensive nature of the plan, coupled with the upcoming Gaza Reconstruction Conference in April, ensures that momentum remains on the side of the Arab position. With international backing solidifying and the outright rejection of displacement gaining traction, the framework for Gaza’s future is becoming more difficult to dismiss outright.
Securing European backing for the plan adds a layer of international legitimacy that extends beyond regional politics. European engagement not only bolsters diplomatic credibility, but also increases the likelihood of financial support from international institutions and donors, a crucial factor in turning the plan into a tangible reality.
Notably, there are significant parallels between Egypt’s plan and the framework proposed by Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid last month. While there are key differences—particularly regarding international and Palestinian involvement rather than exclusive Egyptian administration as suggest by Lapid—the overlap suggests that a change in Israel’s leadership could make a revised version of this plan politically viable in the future.
However, under the current Israeli government, the plan remains virtually impossible to implement. Netanyahu’s coalition has no political incentive to support this initiative, especially given the renewed backing it enjoys from the Trump administration. As long as the status quo benefits Israel’s far-right leadership, there is little reason for them to engage in a process that seeks to stabilize Gaza rather than control it.
Reactions to the Plan: Cautious Endorsements, Predictable Rejections, and Strategic Calculations
Hamas
Hamas has given a cautious, conditional welcome to certain aspects of the plan but has drawn firm red lines on key issues. While Hamas will not nominate its own members to the proposed interim governing body, it will nevertheless work behind the scenes that it is not politically sidelined. More critically, Hamas refuses to relinquish its weapons, recognizing that disarmament would effectively spell its demise as a political and military force.
The group’s October 7th attack on Israel could have been a strategic move to disrupt an evolving peace process that was gradually sidelining Hamas. Before the attack, despite Netanyahu’s reluctance, diplomatic efforts were inching, however slowly, toward a regional normalization framework within the context of the Abraham accords, with the ultimate goal of normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. If that process had continued, Israel would have ties to most of the key Arab states in the region, including the most influential ones like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and therefore the momentum for reaching a solution to the Israel Palestine conflict would veer towards a political solution that would, naturally, exclude Hamas.
That potentiality, combined with the internal pressures facing the right-wing Likud government in late September 2023, including the extensive protests against its infringement on the Supreme Court and Netanyahu’s corruption charges, could have led to a more moderate government taking power and engaging with Arab states. The resultant normalization would have left Hamas with reduced support domestically as the prospects of a peace agreement rose, and alternatives to conflict became more possible.
In that scenario, Hamas would have faced mounting pressure from Arab states and the Palestinian public to moderate its approach or risk marginalization, either dissolving within a broader Palestinian coalition or dissipating entirely.
Israel
Predictably, the Israeli minister of foreign affairs has criticized and rejected the plan outright, claiming that it was rooted in outdated perspectives, indicating that Israel rejects the notion of a Palestinian state. He also took the opportunity to criticize both UNRWA and the Palestinian Authority and accused Arab states of using the Palestinians against Israel for political pressure since it was established. It called for the implementation of Trump’s plan -essentially ethnic cleansing of Gaza- and called on its neighbors to break free from past constraints (i.e. a Palestinian state) and move forward.
In contrast to the Egyptian-led initiative, Israel reaffirmed its preference for Trump’s displacement proposal, which envisions evicting Gaza’s population rather than rebuilding it. Israel’s message to its neighbors was clear—it considers any return to a two-state paradigm an outdated constraint and is pushing for a radically different geopolitical realignment in the region.
Israel’s rejection of the plan is not just ideological but strategic. Under the current government, Israel has no incentive to accept a proposal that requires what it considers to be concessions—especially when it is already altering the geopolitical landscape in its favor. With free rein to operate militarily in Gaza, continued territorial expansion in the West Bank, and no significant pressure from Washington, Israel sees no benefit in engaging with this framework.
By rejecting the plan outright, Netanyahu’s government can continue its strategy of “facts on the ground”—altering territorial and political realities while postponing any negotiations indefinitely, and if compelled to negotiate, to do so from a considerably improved position. From Israel’s perspective, engaging with this proposal would force limitations on its current military and territorial gains without offering any concrete advantages.
There are several other obstacles preventing Israeli acceptance of the plan, with Hamas’ future being the most contentious. The gradual disarmament and political sidelining of Hamas, as outlined in the Egyptian proposal, directly contradicts Israel’s war objectives. Netanyahu’s government has framed the war as a fight to eradicate Hamas entirely—a position that has become a central pillar of its legitimacy. Any agreement that allows Hamas to exist in any form, even temporarily, would be politically disastrous, likely destabilizing Netanyahu’s coalition and potentially triggering a government collapse.
Beyond Hamas, Israel strongly opposes the presence of international peacekeepers, particularly those affiliated with the United Nations or UNRWA. Throughout the war in Gaza, Israel has killed UN-affiliated personnel and infrastructure at an unprecedented rate. Any international presence in Gaza or the West Bank would restrict Israel’s operational freedom, increase documentation of human rights violations, and challenge Israel’s ability to control the conflict’s narrative. Netanyahu’s government is therefore highly unlikely to accept any framework that involves third-party monitoring or intervention.
Beyond strategic calculations, Netanyahu’s own political survival depends on the continuation of conflict. His governing coalition is held together by hardline right-wing factions that thrive on a state of perpetual crisis. Any significant de-escalation would shift domestic attention back to his corruption trials and security failures, risking his position at the head of government. Even as a ceasefire in Gaza took hold, Netanyahu has ensured new fronts remain open, ramping up West Bank operations, refusing to withdraw from Lebanon, and expanding into Syrian territory. For Netanyahu, it does not particularly matter where the conflict is, so long as there is an ongoing conflict that he can use to rally domestic support in the leadup to next year’s elections.
Should Israel be pressured by the U.S. into negotiations, it is highly likely to engage in deliberate obstruction tactics to derail any potential agreement, ensuring that talks fail before they begin. Beyond negotiation tactics, Israel’s ongoing military operations make any immediate implementation of the plan impossible. As long as Israel maintains full operational control over Gaza and continues expanding into the West Bank, any proposal for Palestinian governance remains theoretical rather than actionable. Unless there is a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward exerting real pressure on Israel, this pattern is unlikely to change.
Despite the Israeli government’s current rejection of the plan, its long-term viability should not be ruled out entirely given the partial overlap between Egypt’s proposal and the framework previously suggested by Yair Lapid, Israel’s opposition leader. This suggests that if Israel undergoes a political shift—particularly a change in leadership—some version of this plan could become viable. Should a more centrist government replace Netanyahu’s hardline coalition, negotiations around a modified framework could gain traction. However, as long as the current administration remains in power, any serious engagement with this plan is unlikely.
The U.S.
The U.S. response has been cautious rather than outright dismissive. Officially, Washington downplayed the feasibility of the plan, stating that it remains committed to Trump’s approach, curiously expressing concern for Palestinian civilians living among the rubble. However, the fact that this response came from the National Security Council’s spokesperson rather than a figure like the U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East who is more directly involved in the talks on the ground, or from the Department of State, suggests that the U.S. may yet be leaving room for engagement.
Further hinting at a shift in Washington’s stance, President Trump did not explicitly reaffirm the displacement proposal during his speech to Congress last night. Instead, he focused on hostage recovery and regional peace under the Abraham Accords, omitting any mention of resettlement or forced removals. This suggests that Trump’s position may be evolving, even if quietly.
Taken together, these signals indicate that Trump’s position on displacement may not be as rigid as Israel claims. While Israel continues to frame Washington’s stance as unwavering, the lack of direct confirmation from Trump himself leaves room for diplomatic maneuvering. For Arab states, this opens the door to engagement with Washington on alternative proposals—potentially creating a pathway for a revised plan that addresses both Israeli security concerns and regional stability.
The Road Ahead: Momentum, Challenges, and Shifting Narratives
With broad international legitimacy, the Egyptian proposal now stands as a viable and tangible counterweight to the displacement option pushed by Trump and Netanyahu. Before this plan, Arab states, particularly Egypt and Jordan, faced mounting pressure to respond to Trump’s vision with more than just opposition—they needed a structured alternative. Now, they have a comprehensive, diplomatically backed plan that allows them to engage more effectively with the U.S. administration. While the proposal remains ambitious and unlikely to gain acceptance under Israel’s current leadership, it is nonetheless anchored in extensive international backing, with the UN, EU, AU, and OIC aligning behind it. This places the Arab states on firmer ground in negotiations with Washington, shifting the discussion from whether displacement will happen to how reconstruction can proceed.
To sustain momentum, Egypt has scheduled the Gaza Reconstruction Conference for April, ensuring that any discussions on the plan will unfold within a framework of rebuilding rather than displacement. This move strategically locks in international engagement, in an attempt to prevent the debate from drifting toward alternative proposals that sideline Palestinian statehood or that involve displacement. Even if political obstacles delay implementation, the conference will keep the plan in focus and rally financial commitments, increasing the likelihood that, when conditions shift, the framework will already be in place.
The plan’s success in shifting international discourse is further reinforced by Europe’s evolving stance. With the U.S. pivoting toward a different global strategic focus, the EU has shown is seeking to carve out a more independent foreign policy—one that does not necessarily align with Washington’s every move. Egypt capitalized on this shift by inviting the President of the European Council to the summit, securing EU engagement in the reconstruction effort. This marks a critical inflection point: the conversation is no longer about resisting forced displacement, but rather about how to ensure long-term stability and reconstruction in Gaza. The narrative has changed, and with it, the terms of international diplomacy moving forward. In a region where momentum often dictates outcomes, Egypt has successfully steered the narrative away from destruction and toward rebuilding, setting the stage for what comes next. The trick is now to sustain the momentum.
With the Cairo Summit reshaping the diplomatic battlefield, the coming months will be defined by strategic moves and countermoves. Will Israel attempt to derail the plan through military escalation or diplomatic obstruction? Will the U.S. quietly engage with the proposal, or double down on Netanyahu’s rejection? And as the April reconstruction conference looms, forcing global actors to take a stance, the real question remains: will this plan set the foundation for Gaza’s recovery—or will it be buried before it even begins?