Years of U.S. Foreign Policy in an Hour: Blinken's Diplomatic Legacy – Part 3: China – Middle East
In this final installment of the series on Anthony Blinken’s interview (part 1 here, and part 2 here), we focus on two pressing topics that define the U.S. foreign policy agenda: China and the Middle East, and wrap up with an overview of the results of his work as a Secretary of State.
Once again we will look at what he said, and what he left unsaid, comparing the results on the ground to the narrative that he presented.
Let’s get into it.
China and the U.S.
China poses the greatest challenge to U.S. global hegemony and the post-World War II international order. Blinken rightly stated that China has a unique ability to reshape global dynamics, potentially disrupting the international order into one that more favorably suits its own interests.
To deal effectively with China, he added, the U.S. would be better served by engaging international partners with similar interests in containing the rising Asian giant. Rather than compete bilaterally, where the U.S. accounts for about 20% of global GDP, bringing allies on board brings the collective total up to near 50% of global GDP, providing significantly more negotiating leverage than the U.S. would have on its own.
In that assessment he is correct for a number of reasons, because while in absolute numbers the U.S. outpaces China in GDP by about 10 trillion USD, China has already overtaken the U.S. economy when adjusted for purchasing power parity. What this means that in a bilateral economic trade war, neither economy would come out unscathed.
Blinken argued that under Trump’s administration, strained U.S. relations with traditional partners encouraged them to hedge their bets toward China, and that the Biden administration succeeded in preventing an impending trade agreement between Europe and China early in its tenure.
Praising his own work on the global stage, Blinken stated that China was now increasingly more disturbed by the more engaged American diplomatic strategy, using Chinese complaints about U.S. policy as a measure of his own success.
When challenged about the oscillating U.S. foreign policy and the dramatic shifts from one administration to another, Blinken deflected, focusing his answer on his assessment of the U.S. under Biden as being a much more effective global actor than it was under Trump.
His assessments of China, and the necessary approaches to managing its rise were largely correct. China has, over the past years, turbocharged its ascendancy with intensive diplomatic and economic outreach across the globe. It has become a center of gravity and a wields considerable influence not only on international economic dynamics, but also on key international security and development issues.
It has positioned itself as an alternative to the U.S. and other traditional powers across the world when engaging with emerging economies, encouraging the rise of economic and regional blocs bringing together developing countries and regional and global actors frustrated with an increasingly untenable global order.
Take for example the growing membership of groups like BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) over the past few years. They evolved into platforms for alternatives to existing economic and political structures that are heavily influenced by the U.S. and Europe. In those platforms, China carries the most weight and wields growing economic and political influence that translates into economic and strategic advances that the U.S. has been largely unable to stymie.
Blinken correctly surmises that in the face of this active and heavily engaged China, adopting isolationist diplomacy would be detrimental to U.S. global influence, but he sidestepped the issue of oscillating foreign policy and its impact on U.S. international credibility. Even if Biden and Blinken’s policies proved effective in curtailing or at least slowing the rise of China of the past 4 years, the fact that these policies will be overturned by the incoming Trump administration is very likely to affect U.S. long term credibility with allies and partners.
With these rapid shifts in positions and policies on economic engagement, including the imposition of tariffs across the board in Europe, Canada, and elsewhere, China becomes a more attractive and reliable economic partner. Long term plans are difficult to formulate if policies can shift dramatically from one administration to the next, and even if one administration were to offer attractive propositions for partners, the concern about those being invalidated with the end of its term makes it more tenable to engage alternative partners.
Chinese strategists, like Blinken, recognize the importance of building an international support base—and China has done so with methodical precision. It has consistently engaged with the Global South, capitalizing on various diplomatic missteps by the U.S. and the West such as their inconsistency of positions in the Ukrainian and Israeli wars, and their excessive weaponization of economic sanctions, moves that have incentivized the search for alternative platforms of engagement that do not rely on Western systems.
China also moves to fill the voids left by the U.S.; for example when the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan in late 2021, it stepped in and began exploring potential opportunities in mining critical mineral and materials in the country, chief among them lithium that is critical for its burgeoning EV industry and other technologies.
Blinken’s assertion that the challenge posed by China will be a protracted long-term affair reflects the facts on the ground. The rivalry between the two great powers will only accelerate as China seeks to carve out new space for itself in the reshuffling international order, and the U.S. tries to maintain its hegemony on the global order.
Overall, his self-evaluation of U.S. policies toward China and its rise did not veer too far from reality. The strategy he adopted was largely correct, and the way he presented it was fairly accurate. The U.S. absolutely stands a better chance at containing the rise of China through effective engagement with partners across the world, and through incentivizing allies to engage with the U.S. as a long-term partner rather than China.
What he did not address however is how ineffective the strategy has proved. China today stands more connected, engaged and growing in influence than it was in 2021 at the start of Blinken’s tenure. U.S. efforts to curb China’s rise did not materialize in the way the Biden administration may have envisioned. China is reshaping the global order as we speak, rallying emerging economies and developing members of the Global South around its demands for a more ‘equitable’ international system that does not defer to the interests of the U.S. and the West.
The incoming U.S. administration is unlikely to curtail this momentum, not only because it has already begun to fray relations with long standing allies, but because increasingly unpredictable and discontinuous long-term policy reduces incentives to engage in strategic partnerships, making the search for alternatives to the U.S. more pressing, and many of the seekers will find that alternative in China.
The Middle East
Anthony Blinken said that he was scheduled to travel to the Middle East on October 10th 2023 for a round of diplomatic engagements around the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and that the October 7th attack and the ensuing war derailed that plan.
Prior to the outbreak of the war, the U.S. positioned itself as the primary mediator for normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, aiming to integrate Israel into a cohesive U.S.-led Middle East framework. It was actively isolating Iran and promoting a broader Middle East policy with the U.S. as its fulcrum, progressively seeking to remove Russian influence and preempt growing Chinese presence in the region.
He asserted throughout the discussion on the Israeli war that the main goal was to avert a recurrence of October 7th, and to ensure the dismantling of Hamas’s capabilities, all the while keeping the welfare of Palestinian civilians in mind. Blinken claimed that he negotiated hard for the rights and welfare of Palestinian civilians, stating that he leveraged U.S. power to ensure humanitarian aid flowed to Palestine despite Israeli resistance.
He emphasized that he argued for hours with the Israeli Prime Minister on the necessity of allowing aid to flow through to Palestinians, threating to stop the visit of President Biden to Israel if that condition were not met. He steadfastly denied any accusations of genocide that the interviewer asked him about Israel’s conduct, claiming that it is operating in a unique environment and that he understands the suffering of the Palestinian people, driving him to seek an enduring solution to the conflict as fast as possible.
He also emphasized the U.S. commitment to Israel’s security, and ensuring through the provision of weapons that it can defend itself against Iran’s proxies in the region, adding that the U.S. is reticent to disagree in public with Israel because those disagreements encourage Hamas to delay negotiations. He appeared flustered as to why there wasn’t more international pressure on Hamas to surrender and confused by the resignations of officials in the State Department who claimed that U.S. policy toward the war was misplaced.
He also preemptively attempted to claim credit for laying the groundwork for resolving the conflict, working with partners in the region on a post conflict plan, expressing aspirations for a newly shaped Middle East that sees Israel integrated into the region and a viable Palestinian state formed. He added that this would require leaders to take some hard decisions and for societies to move beyond the trauma of the war.
Notably, by giving a blank check to the Netanyahu government that is propped up by the extreme right wing in Israel, the U.S. was aware that any possible integration or normalization efforts with the broader Middle East would be considerably more difficult, and would hinge on the constant presence of the U.S. as a mediator. The far-right Israeli government behaved exactly as predicted, using the hostages taken in the October 7th Hamas attack as a pretext to achieve expansionist territorial goals, which put even Arab states with diplomatic relations in a difficult political position.
This aligns with U.S. interests, because by all accounts, an Israel with stable relations with its neighbors, with reduced security threats and integrated with its Arab neighbors may be less reliant on the U.S. and thus less pliable to executing its foreign policy goals in the region. Contrary to Blinken’s claims, broader U.S. interests may be better served by an isolated and reliant Israel rather than an independent, regionally integrated one.
A shaky right-wing government on the brink of war presented an opportunity for the U.S.; it could be used to hammer actors it considered nuisances in the region. The Netanyahu government presented the perfect storm, with a prime minister facing corruption charges and widespread protests and opposition in Israel, dependent on an extreme right wing coalition, his incentives to engage in war and prolong the conflict were very high. By waging war, he could defer dealing with the political crises that he faced at home, and the broader the scope, the greater the likelihood that he would emerge victorious and politically empowered within Israel.
The U.S. used the Israeli war machine to achieve multiple goals, prime among them weakening the architecture of Iran’s -and by extension Russia’s- influence in the Middle East, clearing the field for it to redouble its influence over the strategically critical region.
When coupled with the ouster of Assads regime in Syria, credited largely to Türkiye’s support for the rebels, the U.S. achieved several of its regional goals; Israel is now heavily reliant on the U.S. not only for its regional foreign policy but across the international stage at large, making the Israeli government more amenable to U.S. foreign policy dictates, Iran and Russia’s influence in the Middle East has regressed, and the U.S. stands as the sole actor capable of bringing regional actors to the table.
However, these regional goals came at a cost. U.S. global standing regressed considerably over the past year as a result of its unconditional support for Israel despite its violations of international humanitarian law, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, and the warrants issued by the International Criminal Court for Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant the former Israeli Minister of Defense for charges of crimes against humanity. The repeated votes in the UN on the issue showed the U.S. unable to gather support for it and Israel’s position even with traditionally supportive allies.
The disparity between its language on the wars in Ukraine and Israel exacerbated its receding global credibility; the stark contrast on the U.S. position on illegal occupation of territory by Russia and Israel put a spotlight on its pragmatic rather than principled approach to international affairs. This gave an opening to both China and Russia to take advantage by expanding their influence and international outreach through multiple avenues, including emerging blocs like BRICS.
Having said that however it is important to note that this cost was like factored into the calculations; Blinken and Biden would have understood that any reputational damage arising from U.S. positions on Israel would be manageable in the medium to long terms.
Once the goals of declawing Iran and reducing Russian influence in the Mideast were achieved, it would be a relatively simple matter to leverage strategic U.S. relations with regional actors to address any concerns. It would also be possible to reestablish active engagement with the Global South through a series of assurances and guarantees, offering better prospects than those offered by cooperation with Russia and China.
The U.S. Middle East Strategy yielded the results in needed. Israel is more dependent than ever before on the U.S., Russian/Iranian influence in Syria is all but gone, with the new Syrian government eager to engage with the U.S., the key actors in the neighborhood are eager to play a role in the future of regional dynamics by engaging with the U.S., the new government in Lebanon is close to the U.S.. It has retained effective control of key transit corridors, and maintains security supremacy over the strategic region. A few thorns like the Houthi’s remain, but the overarching goals of U.S. strategy have been effectively achieved.
Closing the Chapter: Blinken’s Diplomatic Scorecard
Blinken and Biden’s foreign policy achievements are a mix of strategic successes and setbacks. The U.S. achieved many of its foreign policy goals under the Biden administration; employing the active engagement strategy proved effective in elevating U.S. global influence, and despite the reputational damage incurred as a result of some of its policies, it is in a better position than it was four years ago.
However, despite the strategic approach being largely on point, it was outmaneuvered by China and Russia on some key issues, most notably the efforts to isolate Russia diplomatically and contain the rise of China. Neither of those broader goals materialized, and neither of them is on course. China is spreading its influence and reach on the diplomatic and economic fronts unabated by repeated efforts to limit its engagement, and Russia showed its diplomatic clout when it hosted the BRICS summit in Kazan.
Had Biden/Harris won the election and pursued Blinken’s strategy for another four years, the compound returns of long terms efforts may have eventually yielded some tangible outcomes on those fronts, but as it stands today, the incoming Trump administration has stated that they intend to reverse course on many of Blinken’s policies. Already, Trump has ruffled the feathers of multiple allies, that found themselves in a position of having to rebuke the incoming President on some of his statements, and partners that were steadfast in their positions supportive of U.S. policy on Russia shifted course shortly after the election.
Blinken’s tenure as Secretary of State can be characterized as effective diplomacy that strengthened U.S. positioning, albeit with reputational costs and some unresolved challenges. While some of his policies and tactics could have benefitted from a more nuanced approach, the overall strategy he employed was successful from the U.S. perspective.
How long this success will last under the Trump administration remains to be seen.