The Arctic Chessboard: Setting the Pieces Before Alaska

In the first piece about the upcoming Alaska summit between Trump and Putin, we looked at how to sift through the waves of content that will flood your feeds and what to watch for through the noise.

Today, we look at the players on the board, and how each of them is scrambling to maximize their advantages as the summit looms.

Knowing where each of the players stand before the summit will shed light on their behaviors in its wake.

First: The Setting

Alaska. It sits on the westernmost edge of American territory, a stone’s throw away from Russia. It has a particular significance in the relationship between the two great powers, having been purchased from Russia in 1867. It connects the two in a historical bond.

It is American territory that once was Russian. It represents a history of cooperation and deal making between them. It straddles the Pacific, a long way from the Atlantic and all it symbolizes (think NATO).

This distance from the Atlantic, from Europe, is not only geographic but political. The European and American positions on the Ukraine war are as far apart as they have ever been, and the chasm continues to widen.

It is as close to neutral territory as can be without bringing in third parties. In my previous piece I made this point in passing, so let me elaborate on it here. Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have both been working hard to host this summit between Trump and Putin. Riyadh hosted the first meeting between American and Russian officials since the beginning of the Ukraine war, and Istanbul hosted similar meetings shortly thereafter, with Turkish president Erdogan offering to host the Trump Putin summit.

Trump and Putin opted for neither of these, allowing them to retain full control of the narrative and claim exclusive success for any outcomes that result on both the domestic and international fronts.

Second: The Players

The players in this game include those present at the table as well as the absentees.

The U.S., Russia, Ukraine and the EU all have skin in the game. As does NATO -not as an alliance but as an organization, an entity that is intent on ensuring its continued relevance in the newly coalescing global order.

Washington wants the Ukraine war concluded on terms that free strategic bandwidth for its confrontation with China (political, economic, and otherwise), without creating the perception of abandoning allies. It wants an acquiescent NATO, with allies following its lead but without Washington being tethered to their interests; the Hague summit showed how far European and American interests diverged over the past six months.

Russia wants a subdued Ukraine, one with no prospects of joining NATO. Unlike during previous NATO expansions in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, Russia’s posture has become significantly more aggressive in responding to perceived threats to its national security embodied in the alliance’s proximity to its borders. It also seeks to thaw its U.S. relations.

The previous trajectory, opposing the collective west under the umbrella of NATO, cornered it into a premature dynamic with China that would lead it to future junior partner status. By engaging with the U.S., Moscow drives a wedge between the allies, and relieves pressure, thus allowing it to forge a more acceptable dynamic with China as a partner of convenience rather than dependence.

The Kremlin further seeks to ensure that Europe is properly deterred. On the long term, there is no guarantee that current Trumpian policy of rapprochement will continue, and therefore it has a window of three years during which it can secure a fortified position that limits Europe’s ability to pressure it politically, economically, or militarily. Essentially it is buying time.

Moscow’s priorities are clear: consolidate territorial gains in Ukraine, secure relief from Western sanctions, and weaken the cohesion of its adversaries. Militarily, Russia is holding its ground. Diplomatically, it is using the summit to normalize direct engagement with the U.S., sending the message that Washington — not Brussels or Kyiv — is the decisive counterparty

Ukraine continues to struggle, relying on European support where once it had the collective might of the transatlantic alliance behind it. The American pivot under Trump has left it more vulnerable militarily and economically, with a less certain trajectory and endgame.

Its priorities are restoring its lost territories -including those captured in 2014- and obtaining security guarantees that preempt any future recurrence of a similar scenario. Ideally, this would include joining NATO -a red line for Russia. It seeks to restore American support, or if it cannot do that at least ensure that the lack of it does not result in a collapse of its defense and security architecture.

Europe, for its part is stuck between a rock and hard place. It was, as I frequently like to point out, essentially dragged into this position in early 2022 by a relentless, well timed, and powerfully executed American diplomatic campaign under the Biden administration. Until early 2022, the two biggest actors in Europe did not want to adopt an adversarial posture toward Moscow.

Nevertheless, three years on, billions of dollars in, and 18 sanctions packages later, Europe is dug in. To withdraw support or pivot now, would send a very disturbing message to all its eastward members that they too could be abandoned under enough pressure. That would spark a domino effect of mistrust and send tremors throughout all current and future European political and security architectures.

On the other hand, to dig in now, even if the war presents a convenient leverage point to increase defense spending and develop strategically autonomous defense systems, presents a set of challenges of its own. With the U.S. geopolitical focus shifted to China rather than Russia, and tilted toward using Russia against China, the cohesion that held the alliance together against Moscow is cracked -at least in the interim. This could leave Europe straining to keep up with the demands of obtaining and then retaining any sense of autonomy.

As economic ties with the U.S. ride waves of tariffs and experience turbulence, and the demands of the ReArm Europe program increase budget strains, and the increased NATO defense commitments agreed to at the most recent summit at the Hague take their toll, Europe may find it unsustainable economically or politically to hold to this line.

It therefore cannot afford to let either Russia or the U.S. to dictate terms, set the pace, or control the narrative.

NATO, under its new secretary general Mark Rutte has developed an urgency in its scramble for continued relevance and survival amid shifting sands of geopolitical change. As the differences between allies take form, and realization dawns on Europe that if it is to attain strategic autonomy it needs to develop continental defense systems independent of transatlantic ones, NATO risks ceding ground. Rutte is working feverishly to avoid this outcome. He is broadening the scope of risks -mentioning China as well as Russia in his statements about risks to the alliance and its members for instance- and roping members into ever growing commitments under the alliance’s umbrella.

He walks the tightrope between American interests – focusing on China- and European ones -focusing on Russia, while trying to ensure that their interests different though they may be, are intertwined with the bloc.

Third: The Game

On the surface the primary issue is the Ukraine conflict. However, the broader perspective is more global in scope. China, Russia and the U.S. are recalibrating their respective global positions. In the de facto multipolar world that is emerging, the U.S. seeks to contain China and prevent a consolidation of a Sino-Russian alliance that would see the U.S. compelled to deter two allied nuclear peers simultaneously. To do so it must tie Russian economic and political interests to American ones, to counterbalance China’s influence on Russia’s global position.

Russia developed an extensive diplomatic campaign over the past few years to counter European and American attempts to isolate it. It showcased its global political weight when it hosted the BRICS summit in Kazan. It was aided in no small part by ham-fisted European attempts to rally support for their position against Russia on moralistic terms that held no weight outside the continent. As it stands today the Russian economy has been hit by 18 sanctions packages and remains resilient and well-integrated into global commerce beyond Western borders.

Nevertheless, it seeks to break the isolation from the west; the U.S. remains the largest economy in the world, a market with unparalleled purchasing power, and it is also the lynchpin of Western policy. By driving a wedge between Washington and its allies, Moscow would give itself breathing room in the near term to end the conflict on favorable terms, and on the longer term to develop a coherent strategy toward an antagonistic Europe and an increasingly powerful China.

Europe’s tightrope walk of balancing between American support and partnership on the near term, while working rapidly toward establishing its autonomous strategic defense has proved a difficult one to walk so far. It needs the war to either continue -so that it can leverage the Russian threat to justify the increased budget strains caused by its increased defense spending- or to end with Russia’s capitulation.

It needs to assure its eastern members that they wont -if a future conflict scenario occurs- be abandoned to their fate, while disentangling itself from its over dependency on American military support. It needs to quickly develop independent deterrents against future Russian encroachment that build on European architectures (the European Defense Agency, the Common European Security Strategy, and most recently ReArm Europe) rather than transatlantic ones.

To do so, it needs to ensure that the outcomes of the current conflict are not determined without its input, and therefore any unilateral moves by Washington with Russia pose a threat. As the U.S. engages with Russia, Europe will harden Ukraine’s position. It has been a pattern throughout the past six months as the White House engaged with the Kremlin; as they engage and seek to set terms for the end of the conflict, Europe hardens its position and scrambles to spoil any outcomes that do not include it. The same is likely to repeat in this case.

Already Europe is working on the 19^th round of sanctions against Russia even as Putin and Trump are set to meet. European leaders have held meetings with Ukraine’s Zelensky since the announcement, supporting his positions of security guarantees first – a nonstarter as far as Moscow is concerned. Their goal is to ensure that Ukraine is on solid enough ground that it does not have to accept any outcome imposed by Russia and the U.S. at their meeting. The aim is clear — make any exclusive U.S.–Russia understanding in Alaska politically impossible to implement in Europe.

In the middle of it all, Ukraine remains embroiled in the conflict. Zelensky is hoping that with enough sustained European support, Kyiv can outlast Moscow’s ability to sustain the war. Ideally, they would be able to stall progress enough that the U.S. gets frustrated with Russian policy and return to the previous administration’s policy of adversarial confrontation and levy more pressure on it to end the war on Ukraine’s favor. Even more advantageous would be that whatever policy the current administration American administration enacts will be reversed by the next one, but that is more than three years away and outlasting it is not guaranteed.

He will hold a hard line for as long as he can, making little to no concessions, and sustain the policy of derailing any progress between Russia and the U.S. that does not include input from Ukraine.

Fourth: General Expectations

If the U.S. and Russia approach a deal — or even produce language hinting at concessions — Europe and Ukraine will respond swiftly and publicly. Expect a hardening of stated positions, renewed calls for unconditional Ukrainian participation in negotiations, and a messaging campaign aimed at undermining the legitimacy of any arrangement reached without them. NATO, in this scenario, will work to insert itself as the guarantor of implementation, positioning the alliance as indispensable to enforcement.

If the talks fail outright, the reactions will be more muted but no less strategic. Washington will frame the failure as principled firmness; Moscow will blame Western inflexibility. For Europe and Ukraine, a failed summit is not a loss but proof that their tactics worked. NATO will seize the moment to reinforce its deterrence posture, using the breakdown to justify further readiness measures on its eastern flank.

If the outcome is deliberately vague — statements on “strategic stability,” “regional security,” or “humanitarian cooperation” without specifics — all players will race to shape the interpretation. The U.S. will present it as groundwork for progress, Russia as recognition of its parity with Washington, NATO as an achievement in alliance cohesion, and Europe and Ukraine as a temporary reprieve that leaves their positions intact.

Already expectations for the summit have been lowered. It is being framed as a listening exercise, reducing hopes for specific implementable outcomes, while retaining the optics of success for both presidents. This indicates that whatever common ground led to announcing the summit may not be as solid as it appeared initially. This decision is already a victory for Europe and Ukraine; where the decision to hold the summit heralded potential challenges, downplaying its expected outcomes delivers a much-needed reprieve.

Now We Wait…

The board is set, the players are in place, and the stakes are rising by the day. Each move from here will be shaped as much by what has already been committed as by what each actor hopes to gain. Washington is looking to pivot toward China without alienating Europe. Moscow is buying time, locking in gains, and testing U.S. willingness to bypass Brussels. Europe is straining to hold a costly line, while NATO is fighting to remain indispensable on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Alaska summit will not end these tensions — but it will recast them. The changes may be subtle: a shift in tone, a narrowing of red lines, a quiet reshuffling of priorities. Yet those nuances will matter, because they will shape the next phase of the conflict and the resulting global reordering.

When the summit ends, the real game begins. Tune in for the next piece in this series, where we’ll unpack the meeting itself — the optics, the language, the deals struck on and off the record — and the immediate fallout for every player at the table.