Smoke and Mirrors: Blinken’s Middle East Debrief at the Atlantic Council
This is a long read, so make your coffee, get comfortable, and settle in.
The outgoing Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, has been on a farewell tour of interviews and speaking events, so there is a lot to unpack, and I started with his interview with my three-part series on his interview on the New York Times (part 1, part 2, part 3).
Today we examine the remarks he delivered on the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, shedding light on the omissions, contradictions, and realities behind his portrayal of U.S. policy in the region.
Blinken, a seasoned veteran of the hallways of power ,of international relations, and office politics walked a very interesting tightrope throughout the statement. He balanced between truths, half-truths, omissions, and wild optimism, while carefully skirting around outright lies.
How honest was his reassessment? Let’s examine it.
The Illusion of Progress? Blinken’s Take on Regional Integration
Setting the stage, Blinken framed his administration’s efforts as a pursuit of lasting regional peace, bringing actors into a cohesive framework under U.S. oversight. The Abraham Accords, a series of agreements brokered by the U.S. to normalize Israel’s ties with Arab countries, were about to include Saudi Arabia according to Blinken. He claimed that he was scheduled for a trip to Saudi Arabia and Israel in October of 2023 (that was cancelled in the wake of the October 7th attacks), to hammer out the details of the deal, which would have included a defense agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and a ‘credible road’ to Palestinian statehood.
While Blinken lauded progress toward the deal, he failed to acknowledge Saudi Arabia’s withdrawal last August, as the prospects of normalizing with the far-right Israeli government all but evaporated as far as the Saudi government was concerned.
Blinken added that the heavy lifting for the normalization between the two states had been done. That, however, may not be not entirely accurate. The heavy lifting, to use his own term, has not even begun. The political toxicity of associating with Netanyahu as far as most Arab governments are concerned comes at a very high cost domestically, so any normalization process would have a very difficult starting point. It would also would not even begin to be considered before the war in Gaza ends, and Blinken is fully aware of this. There is also no ‘credible road’ to Palestinian statehood under current conditions, a prerequisite for Saudi’s agreement to any normalization with Israel.
Blinken was half honest when he stated that it was in U.S. interests to ensure Israeli integration with its Arab neighbors. He was honest in that the U.S. pushed for the normalization, but omitted the fact that the U.S. would not allow this to happen without its direct involvement or oversight. He also excluded the fact that he and his Department are well aware of the fact that the current Israeli government leans heavily on an extremist right wing coalition that has no aspirations of integration, but rather of expansionism.
Furthermore, the Department of State would have already surmised that any hope of normalization in the future would hinge on the presence of a moderate Israeli government, and yet through its actions (whether deliberately or inadvertently) the U.S. has empowered the right wing in Israel and heavily weakened the Israeli left over the course of the last year, further reducing the chances of independent Israeli engagement with Arab states.
The U.S. may have an interest in an integrated Israel, but it certainly has no interest in encouraging any engagement between Israel with Arab states that does not rely on direct U.S. involvement. Israel, as far as the U.S. is concerned, should exist in a state of perpetual reliance on the U.S. for its security, and that would be negated by normalized relations that neutralize potential threats to its defenses.
An Israel independent of U.S. influence, integrated within a regional architecture, coexisting in peace would lead to every country in the region raising questions about U.S. military presence in the area. The instability of the region provides an important pretext for perpetual U.S. presence in a region that is both rich in resources, and of considerable geostrategic value: it contains critical transit routes and waterways, and provides access to Europe and Asia from the south and the west respectively.
Mixing truths and carefully calibrated omissions, Blinken attempted to portray the U.S. as an idealistic peacemaker in the region rather than a pragmatic actor intent on securing its own interests, even at the expense of its allies in the region.
Gaza’s War Through Blinken’s Lens: Spin Meets Facts
Blinken, quite accurately, asserted that one of the main motivations behind Hamas’s assault on Israel on October 7th was to derail any progress toward normalization between Israel and Arab states. Normalization, particularly with Saudi Arabia, would have further marginalized Hamas, strengthening the Palestinian Authority instead.
As an organization rooted in Islamist political thought, it was never popular with the governments of the region, some of which branded it a terrorist organization for brief periods. Normalization, particularly with Saudi Arabia, would have compelled Israel to deliver on promises of this ever elusive ‘credible road’ to Palestinian statehood, which would in turn have empowered the Palestinian Authority to take the lead in all Palestine with the support of regional and international actors alike.
Blinken went on to celebrate Israel’s success in decimating Hamas’s leadership, and moments later complained that Hamas was able to refill its ranks almost immediately. He then shifted back to stating that Israel had achieved the objective of preventing another October 7th, spurring President Biden to propose his peace plan. It was a perplexing set of sentences to navigate, further complicated by Netanyahu’s repeated statements that the destruction of Hamas was the goal.
Nevertheless, he pressed onward, commending himself and President Biden on successfully negotiating a ceasefire between the two sides, one that was hammered out days before Biden and Blinken were due to leave office and included allowing unfettered humanitarian access, release of hostages, and the release of Palestinian detainees from Israeli prisons -including women and children. How long it will hold, and how much credit is due to President Elect Trump remains an open question.
Blinken reiterated here what he said in previous statements and interviews, that he and Biden sought to end the war in manner that would lay the foundation for enduring peace, that Gaza could not be used as a platform for violent attacks, and that it would be under Palestinian led governance without Hamas or other extremists. Israel, in this scenario, would no longer besiege or block it, and would refrain from displacing people from their homes or expand occupation or settlements. There would be a “pathway” toward coexistence.
The optics of this ceasefire agreement for Biden’s administration however may not be as rosy as Blinken is painting them. In addition to the fact that the Prime Minister of Israel made it a point to thank President Elect Trump as well as Biden, the delay in reaching a ceasefire ensures that Blinken is not the one tasked with its implementation, nor is he the one tasked with forging ahead with the day after plans for the reconstruction of Gaza and this elusive “pathway” to a Palestinian state. He can claim success for the ceasefire, without actually having to implement any part of it.
Blinken, throughout his discussion on the war in Gaza, stated that he and Biden stood by the Israeli goal of never allowing another October 7 to happen. Yet they supported an Israeli approach that likely feeds the continued cycle of resentment and violence; reports from experts within the U.S would have presented Blinken with alternative strategies, such as leveraging regional actors like Egypt and Jordan to marginalize Hamas without widespread devastation. Hamas could possibly have been effectively neutralized through a concerted campaign involving the support of regional partners who held no love for the organization and would have welcomed the opportunity to support its uprooting. He does not mention that that option was never explored.
While touting his success in rallying support for a U.S. ceasefire resolution in the UN, Blinken omitted the five occasions the U.S. vetoed similar resolutions, sometimes as the sole opposing vote.
He also left out, when portraying U.S. international leadership, the damage that U.S. credibility took insofar as its commitment to international law is concerned, particularly when it opposed the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Isreal’s potentially genocidal practices, and its strong opposition to the International Criminal Court’s warrants for Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. In those two instances, the U.S. position has led to reduced trust in its objectivity or adherence to international law, or its support for multilateral processes, particularly given U.S. support for the ICC when it issued warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Collectively, its positions on the Israel Palestine conflict have eroded trust in U.S. global influence. Its positions, driven in part by geostrategic goals in the region, were also the result of internal pressures, including navigating interest groups with the U.S. political system, as well as adherence to national legislations like the Leahy law that prohibits the U.S. from allocating funds to assist foreign security forces implicated in gross violations of human rights. The latter consideration would compel the U.S. government to reassess its assistance to Israel if it were to accept that it had committed human rights violations, a matter that would negatively impact its own geostrategic goals.
Overall, Blinken attempted to categorize the U.S. role on the conflict as a constructive one focused on regional integration and the wellbeing of civilians, and the achievement of enduring peace. His deliberate omissions and misrepresentations, however, left more questions than answers about U.S. interests.
Regional Chessboard: U.S. Strategy Beyond the Headlines
Blinken’s points on the broader regional perspective served to contextualize some of the decisions made by the U.S. government concerning its support for Israel. He praised the successful declawing of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the reduction of Iran’s influence, and the successful defense against its missile attacks targeting Israel.
He welcomed the fall of the Assad regime and what it implied in terms of reduced Russian and Iranian influence in the region. In this segment of his remarks he gloated on the U.S. ability to exacerbate the crises facing the primary supporters of the regime, implying that the Biden administration may have been deliberately prolonging the war in Ukraine to drain Russia and weaken its influence elsewhere. Its not clear whether this admission was a slip of the tongue or deliberate but nevertheless helps in understanding U.S. approaches to the broader context.
Rather than supporting Israel for Israel’s sake, when taken in a broader context, it sheds light on another possibility. By empowering the far right in Israel – the more war prone segment of the Israeli political spectrum- the U.S. effectively wielded Israel as a proxy too counter U.S. regional adversaries, prioritizing its own strategic goals over Israeli long-term stability. It neutralized Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, weakened Iran’s presence, and reduced Russia’s influence, and yet, as Blinken admitted Hamas has already refilled its ranks. American targets have been achieved, and Israeli ones were deprioritized.
He went on to state that the outcomes of this conflict have sent a clear message to actors in the region on who defuses crises and who makes them worse, but the message received in the Middle East may may not have been the one he implied in his statement, as evidenced by the Saudi Arabian withdrawal from the defense pact with the U.S..
On the other hand, he decried the cynical ‘exploitation’ of the conflict by terrorist groups to boost recruitment and foment anti American sentiment. He omitted however the reports that he would have received as Secretary of State that would have given him early warning of this eventuality in the early days of the war. The process was and remains predictable and linear given the view that the U.S. is broadly perceived as the main enabler of the war through its provision of the means of its perpetuation -weapons, intelligence, etc.- and the political cover it provided for Netanyahu and his government to act unrestrained by any laws of war or human rights considerations.
He also criticized autocrats for their use of the conflict to justify their atrocities and aggression, and advance their efforts to challenge international ‘rules.’ In this instance, his choice of the word ‘rules’ rather than ‘laws’ was carful and deliberate, because he understands that the two are not the same. The ‘rules’ are vaguer, open to interpretation, subjective, and hinge on U.S. definitions, while ‘laws’ are clear and impartial. Furthermore, his surprise at the leveraging of the conflict -and specifically Israeli actions during- to justify atrocities elsewhere was disingenuous. It is something that would have been flagged immediately to his attention when hostilities broke out, and was one of the drivers of resignations from the Department of State over the past year because of its impact on American credibility abroad due to allegations of complicity.
Despite these misgivings, his assessment that the U.S. position in the region has improved as a result of this conflict is largely correct. With the fall of Assad reducing Russian regional presence, and Iranian proxies largely neutralized, the U.S. stands as the primary global hegemon in the Middle East. Both Israel and Arab states are heavily reliant on it to achieve any progress in discussions, and absent alternatives, hinge on U.S. support for achieving stability in the region. Even the temporary wane in credibility as a result of U.S. support for Israel in its war will have to make way for practical considerations moving forward; they may not like it, but they have no choice but to work with the U.S.
The ‘Day After’ Plan: Idealism or Illusion?
Blinken then laid out plans for the day after the war. His proposal leans toward an idealistic vision, encouraged I would imagine by the fact that he will not personally have to be involved in its implementation.
Blinken’s vision centers on an interim administration for Gaza led by the Palestinian Authority (PA), overseen by international partners. It would then be theoretically handed over to a fully reformed PA as soon as is ‘feasible’. The PA security forces would comprise elements from ‘partner nations’ and vetted Palestinian personnel to create a secure environment for humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. He referred to some nations expressing interest in participating if Gaza and the West Bank are reunified under a reformed PA, adding that it was important to prevent Hamas from being involved in any governance structure within Gaza.
This vision, that he presents as if it were a great aspiration, would essentially undermine any notion of Palestinian self determination. This structure that includes oversight of the PA by the international community and the vetting of its personnel by international actors detracts from any credibility it would have with Palestinians that it works in their interests. It would be viewed as an agent of control installed to ensure the interests of Israel and the international community that it served rather than those of the Palestinians.
Statements about handing over authority ‘when feasible’ perpetuate a mirage of independence, as the structural barriers to feasibility remain firmly entrenched. It essentially congeals the status quo for Palestinians, while dangling a mirage of ‘credible pathways’ to independence in front of it as a motivation.
He also did not clarify how Hamas would be uprooted from Gaza. Blinken neglected in his presentation some basics of counterinsurgency, which point out that aggressive all-out war against a civilian population often fuels recruitment for groups like Hamas. He admitted earlier in his remarks that Hamas had already essentially refilled its ranks, but did not address this when speaking of the future of Gaza. How exactly would a PA, even one supported by the ‘international community,’ be expected to go against a trained and tested fighting force that the survived the full force of Israel’s onslaught for 15 months remains unstated.
Blinken then moved onto the importance of a ‘conditions based time bound’ credible pathway to Palestinian independence that included iron clad security guarantees for Israel. He asserted that this would provide the horizon that regional and international actors need to be actively involved, while referencing reluctance of regional actors to invest in reconstruction and rebuilding when the threat of destruction remains ever present.
With the new administration however, that is unbound by the same strategic goals as Biden’s presidency, regional actors may explore mechanisms of involvement that at least alleviate suffering of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, while understanding that the policy goals may be different but the support for Israel will remain unconditional, and unlikely to manifest in any significant pressure on Israel to adhere to international law or make significant concessions.
In what appears to be an attempt to convey a semblance of objectivity, Blinken leveled some carefully curated criticisms at Israel. He criticized its undermining of the PA -including its withholding of PA tax money-, its expanding settlements, the increase in settler violence, and even mentions that Israel has fallen short of expectations when it comes to the humanitarian situation in Gaza. He added that Israelis must abandon the myth they can carry out de facto annexation, without cost and consequence to Israel’s democracy, to its standing, and to its security.
Blinken referenced Israel’s increasing international isolation, and the regression in its efforts to integrate within the region, with governments under pressure to distance themselves from normalization, even going as far as stating that existing peace deals may be threated prolonging the war. He is largely correct in his estimations; association with the current Israeli government is politically problematic for Middle Eastern leaders, and could result in considerable political pressures on the domestic fronts.
He did not mention however that this aligns with U.S. interests. Despite the high level of tension caused by the war, at the end of it, and as a result of the increased difficulty in direct engagement between Israel and other actors in the region, the need for American mediation has grown. Despite its reliance on the conflict to further its political aims, the Netanyahu government desperately needs U.S. support in restoring communication within the region, as do other regional actors.
Israel under its current conditions is in no position to alienate the U.S., which has severely weakened the former’s internal political ecosystem over the past year and a half in a manner mirroring colonial divide and conquer policies. The parallels are stark if we pause and consider them. By providing financial and military support for the extreme right under Netanyahu’s government, and political cover against any accountability, the U.S. empowered the extreme right beyond what it would have been otherwise. It also weakened the more moderate voices within Israel, those that would have been open to alternative methods of engagement on Hamas and other regional issues. This has also helped foment antagonism with Israeli society that predicates U.S. support to maintain stability.
Closing the Chapter: Blinken’s Middle East Strategy
Blinken, throughout these remarks, emphasized the point that the U.S. sought peace, and that strategic advancements were made over the past 15 months. Nevertheless, he reaffirmed that the despite its significant influence in the region that it did not have the ability to dictate outcomes. He stated that the path forward required hard decisions, that it would be difficult but not impossible,
He laid the blame on the regional actors, implicitly of course, for not finding a way forward. he stated that he and President Biden had already laid the groundwork for the future, the one which includes this ever-elusive pathway to statehood for Palestine and strong security guarantees for Israel. The roadmap he mentioned is idealistic to say the least, but that is no longer his problem because he need not worry about having to implement it.
Notably absent from Blinken’s roadmap is any mention of accountability for human rights violations, a critical element in historical conflict resolutions and societal rebuilding; think of the critical role the Nuremberg Trials, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia played in restoring peace and stability in their respective regions, and what their absence would have entailed for those regions moving forward.
Conceding that not all his decisions may have been correct, Blinken alluded to people questioning whether the policies enacted were in U.S. best interests, or whether varied approaches could have yielded different results. In posing this question, he is implying that the U.S. did not really consider alternative approaches, even though he would have received multiple reports and recommendations proposing alternative ways to large scale war that may have yielded entirely different results without incurring the same costs.
When all is said and done however, it seems that U.S. regional goals were obtained. By using Israel as a regional battering ram, it achieved its goals of declawing and incapacitating the persistent challenges to its influence in the region, while resecuring Israel’s overreliance on the U.S. for everything from security to political mediation. The ouster of Assad’s regime and the subsequent withdrawal of Iranian and Russian influence from Syria -which admittedly had more to do with Turkish rather than American involvement- further reinforced U.S. regional hegemony.
The U.S. may not be popular as a result of its policies, but no regional actor has a viable alternative to it as a partner, and moving forward no other actor, regional or global is in a position to subsume the American role. It has effective security predominance in the region, and is poised to mediate stability and reengagement between Israel and the Arab states. It has pushed Iran out, despite its efforts to positively engaged with the region under its new president, and is uncontested by Russia due to the ouster of Assad’s regime in Syria.
Blinken received criticism for his policies toward the middle east since the breakout of the war, much of it centered around the damage to U.S. credibility and reputation as a global leader and a principled country. Yet at least for the medium term, the Machiavellian approach to the region has noticeably improved U.S. leverage over its main actors. Critiques of U.S. policy often assume inherent credibility with regional actors, yet they have long viewed American actions as self-serving, with principles applied selectively to suit its strategic goals, and therefore any reputational damage incurred can be mitigated by ensuring aligning of interests.
As it stands today, U.S. interests have been advanced considerably in the Middle East. How this will stand will rely entirely on the approach adopted by the incoming administration, and the region—and the world—will be watching.