Emmanuel Macron is making a move — and he’s doing it in the wake of a highly visible and diplomatically successful visit to Egypt. In Cairo, he made his position on Palestine unmistakably clear: the two-state solution is “the only way forward,” and any ethnic cleansing of Gaza is “unacceptable.”
Building on that momentum, but carefully choosing not to make that announcement in Cairo, he stated that France is now openly considering recognition of Palestine, a move that would make it the first Western permanent member of the UN Security Council and the twelfth EU country to do so, bringing the bloc to the brink of a majority.
In June, Macron is set to co-host a high-profile conference on the two-state solution with Saudi Arabia, which he hinted may be the moment he formally recognizes Palestine. This conf
But this shift isn’t driven by newfound moral clarity. Macron hasn’t uncovered new truths about the conflict — he’s seizing a geopolitical opening. What we’re witnessing is a calculated repositioning of France’s Middle East policy, rooted in strategy, not sentiment.
The Shift: France’s Bid for Leadership
A Leadership Vacuum in Europe
France is not acting in isolation, it’s moving to fill a vacuum. In the wake of America’s strategic pivot away from Europe, the continent has been scrambling to reposition itself in an unfamiliar global order. The American shift was not just in the Russia-Ukraine nexus, but rather across the board. The Trump administration has been vocalizing interest in acquiring a fellow NATO member’s territory -Greenland- and toying with the Economic relations between the two long standing allies. This frames the American pivot as more than a simple disagreement in policy, more akin to a broad redesign of the relations.
In that vacuum, France, Germany and the UK began jostling for leadership of the continent, exploring ways to rally it, galvanize it, and achieve the much discussed by not yet attained strategic autonomy.
Germany, long viewed as Europe’s de facto anchor, is politically entangled. Its governing coalition is still finding its footing in the wake of the recent elections, while the far-right AfD has surged since the elections to become the most popular political force in the country — yet remains excluded from power by the other parties. As Berlin navigates its internal reshuffling, it has yet to enter the European race for leadership in earnest.
Meanwhile, the UK — though no longer an EU member — is attempting to reassert itself as the transatlantic bridge between Washington and Europe, presenting itself as an indispensable ally for the EU, aligning with its positions rather than Washington’s on Ukraine and Russia, and putting its weight behind European initiatives.
France’s answer? To define a European policy agenda that is distinct — especially when it comes to the Middle East. Seizing the moment, with a distracted Germany and a UK no longer in the club, Macron pressed his advantage.
Breaking Away from Washington’s Script
France, along with other European states, are now operating on the imperative of achieving autonomy from U.S. global policies across various theatres in the international arena. They are no longer bound to a collective position; quite the contrary they are actively pursuing policies that are entirely misaligned with American ones.
In the Middle East is a region the U.S. has dominated for decades through deep ties with both Arab states and Israel. Washington has very effectively played regional powers off one another, kept itself indispensable, and dictated the parameters and the pace of diplomacy – and war. By December 2024, with the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria, Washington had virtually no global or regional competition left in the area. It had used Israel to grind down its regional rivals, and could claim alliances from Cairo to Baghdad nearly uncontested; neither Russia not China have any comparable footprint, and Iran’s influence has been pushed out of the Arab sphere.
One constant of American policy however, its unwavering and unconditional support for Israel, has often been a source of tension with Arab states, at least for public consumption. While those states tolerate it diplomatically, the contradiction is often repackaged as a public grievance to placate domestic sentiment. While this policy served American interests well throughout the decades, yielding significant rewards across the board, it also now presents the point of entry for rivals seeking to introduce themselves as serious actors in the region.
Enter Europe — and specifically, France. What does the EU want from the Middle East? Above all: energy access. Strategic autonomy can’t exist without energy security. And when the U.S. forced Europe to cut ties with Russian gas in 2021, it replaced it with American LNG, embedding a new kind of dependence, featuring both energy and security. A short-sighted decision it may have been, but it was founded on an alliance that had remained undisturbed for decades, and was the easy way out for a continent that had become accustomed to dependency on Washington.
However, with Trump’s second-term pivot away from Europe, this situation is no longer tenable. With misaligned policies, unpredictable decision-making patterns in Washington, reliance is no longer a strategically sound policy. Diversification has become an imperative.
The Middle East — especially a post-Assad Syria — offers a pipeline route and access point to new energy flows. Reestablishing ties with Middle Eastern states with a Eurocentric focus has become a critical policy directive in the halls power in European capitals. Capitalizing on the delayed American engagement with the new Syrian government, Paris hosted a high level meeting on Syria including Syria’s new minister of foreign affairs, followed by a conference call between the presidents of France, Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus and Greece, and began lifting sanctions.
Through these proactive steps, France made one thing clear: Europe, not the U.S., would be the first Western partner of the new Syrian government. Syria’s geostrategic position presents a potential pipeline of energy to Europe, and this active engagement is setting the stage for cooperation toward that goal, feeding into Europe’s energy diversification efforts.
Then, just last week, when Macron met with Egyptian President Al-Sisi, he came to Cairo with a €220 million loan-grant package that will cushion the void left by uncertainty surrounding U.S. development assistance (separate from military assistance that remains untouched), and elevated its relationship with Egypt to a strategic partnership, and continues delivery of its Rafale jets to Egypt, helping the latter diversify its air force and reduce its dependence on the American F-16s.
Altogether, France’s role in the Middle East has experienced renewed vigor, freed from the limitations of alignment with U.S. policy and focused on Eurocentric objectives.
Which brings us to Palestine. France’s willingness to even consider recognition isn’t just a diplomatic gesture — it’s a political statement: France is no longer playing by American rules.
Any European state could choose to recognize Palestine. But France is timing this consideration for maximum strategic effect. Even without formal recognition, the public announcement that it’s under review signals a break from previous policy patterns.
This is a message aimed at Washington, at the Arab world, and at Europe itself.
If France pulls this off, it won’t just be taking a stance on Palestine, it will be carving out a new geopolitical role for itself, and potentially for Europe.
Hijacking the Crown Jewel: France, Palestine, and the Saudi Pivot
Macron’s recognition gamble doesn’t just signal European independence, it directly challenges the architecture of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East, and it does so at its most sensitive point: Saudi Arabia.
For years, Riyadh has been the ultimate diplomatic prize in Washington’s normalization campaign, the long-courted yet elusive partner in the Abraham Accords. Both the Trump and Biden administrations worked to fold Saudi Arabia into the deal, offering sweeping defense packages and security guarantees in exchange for ties with Israel. But the one thing Washington never offered — and perhaps never intended to beyond allusions to a “credible pathway” — was Palestinian statehood.
France is now stepping into that blind spot.
By co-chairing a major two-state solution conference with Saudi Arabia, and publicly considering recognition of Palestine, Macron is offering Riyadh an alternative path: recognition through reciprocity. This reframes the process not as a unilateral concession to Israel, but as a balanced diplomatic exchange, something Washington could never credibly propose without contradicting its own political commitments and domestic political ecosystem.
What makes this maneuver so potent is what it exposes. Macron is offering a model the U.S. cannot easily match — a mutual recognition framework in which both Israel and Palestine gain diplomatic legitimacy. That runs counter to the Abraham Accords model, which asked Arab states to normalize relations with Israel without resolving the Palestinian issue.
By offering recognition not as a final concession but as a starting point for reciprocity, Macron reframes the sequence of regional diplomacy. And if Saudi Arabia even partially embraces this framing — publicly or behind closed doors — it undermines years of American positioning in the region.
This is more than symbolic positioning, it’s a direct spoiler move aimed at unraveling the logic of the Abraham Accords, or at least showing that the West’s policy toward the region no longer flows exclusively through Washington.
Regional Realignment
If Macron follows through, it would give Arab states a Western partner that appears politically aligned with their stated positions, without the weight of Washington’s contradictions. For Saudi Arabia, this shift creates maneuvering space, a way to engage with a Western power on regional diplomacy without signing onto the American script. It also provides it with bargaining leverage with Washington; having an alternative western partner on this issue may compel the U.S. to readjust its position to ensure its primacy in the region.
And within Europe, the calculus is just as powerful. France would not only outpace Germany and Italy diplomatically, but it would also redraw the boundaries of European leadership. With eleven EU members already recognizing Palestine, Macron’s move could force others off the fence, and leave Berlin increasingly isolated.
In this way, Macron isn't just shifting policy. He’s shifting alliances, showing that Europe can now act independently in a region long monopolized by American power. Recognition of Palestine becomes the instrument through which France builds relevance, leverage, and leadership, in both the Middle East and Europe.
In short, Macron is rewriting the rules and if this move succeeds, it will mark the first time in decades that a Western power other than the United States dictated the terms and outcomes of Middle East diplomacy.
Winners, Losers, and the Stakes of Recognition
Over the past few weeks, I’ve been critical of Europe’s fragmented approach to foreign policy, but something appears to have shifted. Beyond the summits, meetings, and change by committee approach that seemed to have taken over the continent, we are now witnessing a coherent and coordinated push toward actual continental independence.
France’s moves in Egypt, its organization of the upcoming two-state solution conference with Saudi Arabia, its organization of the Syria meetings in Paris, and its potential recognition of Palestine form a clear arc. They’re not isolated events, they’re strategic positioning. Add to that the Spanish Prime Minister visiting Beijing, and the EU’s active trade engagement with India and the UAE exploring free trade terms even as Washington oscillates on tariffs, and you begin to see the outline of a Europe that is re-entering the global arena on its own terms.
For France and the EU, the best-case scenario is obvious: to reintroduce themselves as a serious diplomatic alternative to the United States in the Middle East. While Europe may not be able to substitute the U.S. as the region’s security guarantor, its economic weight is comparable, and its defense industry — from arms to aviation — offers real alternatives. The Rafale fighter jet deals with Egypt are a case in point: Europe can help regional states diversify their dependencies. Through this they gain access to markets, investors, customers, and energy.
This is deeply problematic for the U.S. and for Netanyahu, though not necessarily for Israel as a state. For Netanyahu, recognition of Palestine by a Western UNSC member - and one with influence in Europe and the Arab world - threatens the conflict narrative he thrives on. It shows there are legitimate, implementable paths forward. That’s not a message his government wants circulating, though it may be welcome in other political circles in Israel that are actually seeking stability rather than conflict as an outcome.
For the U.S., Macron’s moves undercut Washington’s monopoly on Middle East diplomacy. If France recognizes Palestine, it doesn’t just shift European dynamics, it alters the Security Council landscape itself. With Russia and China already on board, France’s recognition would tip the balance: three of five permanent members would now support Palestinian statehood. That’s a diplomatic milestone with global resonance. It also presents Arab governments with an alternative Western partner to engage with when Washington fails to deliver; while France does not have the same influence over Israel as Washington does, it can still introduce itself as a mediator where none was present before.
What France has done is set off a chain reaction in the Middle East, and also within the very architecture of Europe and the West. And whether or not formal recognition is announced in June, the signal has already been sent:
Europe is breaking free from Washington’s orbit and beginning to chart its own course.